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Statistically aggregating even a few estimates can yield improvements over individual 
judgments. But before aggregating, one must first decide whom to ask. One strategy might be to 
ask a socially diverse group, as diverse people are expected to contribute different perspectives. 
Related to this idea, the aims of this dissertation were threefold. The first aim was to determine 
the necessary conditions under which socially diverse crowds outperform homogeneous crowds 
for a given numerical judgment. The second aim was to test to what extent these conditions are 
met in real judgment tasks across a variety of social identities and judgment questions. The third 
aim was to determine how realistic laypeople are when appraising the accuracy advantages – or 
lack thereof – of socially diverse crowds.  
Chapter I reviews relevant literature on judgment, groups, and diversity. The discussion 
makes clear that the question of whether social diversity boosts crowd accuracy cannot be 
answered by the extensive literature on group diversity. The chapter nevertheless reviews that 
work and uses it to guide hypotheses while at the same time drawing distinctions between the 
questions asked here and the questions previously answered. 
A model in Chapter II tests when socially diverse crowds will outperform homogeneous 
ones. Findings suggest that diversity only improves crowd judgment when the relationship 
between group membership and judgment is at least moderate in size and when the true value 
lies between the distributions of the two groups. Chapter III then seeks to observe these 
conditions in real judgment tasks. Results indicate that the conditions for diversity benefits are 
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rarely observed in empirical data. People’s social identities did not strongly bias their judgments 
across a wide variety of topics, and homogeneous and diverse crowds performed about equally 
well on numerical judgment tasks. 
Studies IV.1-IV.5 examined lay beliefs about diversity advantages. People typically 
overestimated the relative accuracy of socially diverse groups over homogeneous groups. That 
overestimation arose from people’s erroneous assumptions about meeting the “diversity benefit 
conditions” in the model (Studies IV.1 – IV.2). Specifically, people (1) overestimated the effect 
of social identity on judgment and (2) expected bracketing to occur to some degree. People 
expected diverse crowds to be optimal when they assumed these conditions are present, but not 
when they assumed that those conditions were absent.  
Studies IV.3-IV.5 suggest that people are willing to act on those erroneous beliefs. They 
are far more likely to choose advice from a diverse crowd, even when a homogeneous crowd 
would be more accurate (Study IV.3), and they are willing to pay more money to see advice from 
a diverse crowd than a homogeneous one when completing a numerical judgment task (Study 
IV.4-IV.5). Finally, Chapter V reviews the findings in the dissertation, discusses implications 







Improving judgment accuracy is a major step towards improving decision quality. To 
improve accuracy, popular intuition recommends considering multiple people’s opinions: “Two 
heads are better than one.” Implementing this strategy has never been easier thanks to advances 
in communication and collaboration technologies. But optimal implementation remains a 
challenge; how can someone make a group as “wise” as possible? Simply convening a group of 
experts is one obvious possibility, but experts are not always readily identifiable or available, 
especially to the layperson.  
Another popular strategy for maximizing the effectiveness of “many heads” is to include 
“diverse heads” (Galinsky et al., 2015; Page, 2008). There are many different kinds of diversity, 
but people often mean social, demographic diversity when they discuss its utility for groups and 
teams (McGrath, Berdahl, & Arrow, 1995; Northcraft, Polzer, Neale, & Kramer, 1995; Page, 
2008). The present work therefore specifically tests how beneficial social diversity is for 
improving group performance above and beyond the performance of socially homogeneous 
groups. I focus on one particular task – numerical judgment – and the “groups” refer to statistical 
combination of people’s estimates after people have individually made their judgments. The 






Group composition and coordination 
Assuming that knowledge and skills are differentially distributed among people, a group 
is likely to have more skills and abilities at its disposal than a given individual. Whether a group 
performs at its full potential depends on a variety of factors, such as what kind of diversity is 
present in the group, how the group members coordinate their contributions, the nature of the 
task at hand, and what is meant by “performance.” In the present work, “performance” refers to 
numerical judgment accuracy, and the nature of the task is numerical judgment as opposed to 
other activities like problem solving. The next sections describe what I mean by “diversity” and 
“coordination.” 
Group diversity. Group composition can be described in many ways, such as according 
to its members’ specializations. Research suggests that this type of diversity – cognitive diversity 
– is beneficial for group performance (Page, 2008). The present work focuses on social diversity, 
broadly conceived, because it is often what people mean when they refer to “diversity” (McGrath 
et al., 1995). Thus socially “diverse” groups include people that are different along a social, 
demographic factor like sex, cultural background, or educational attainment. Homogeneous 
group members all share a social identity (e.g., all are men). 
Social diversity is often promoted on the grounds that it will enhance group performance 
by boosting cognitive diversity in a group. People and organizations often make this social-
cognitive diversity connection (Northcraft et al., 1995; Page, 2007), but is it warranted? Research 
supports the connection to some degree. Race influences perceptions of social interactions 
(Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002), culture influences predictions of stock market trends 
(Ji, Zhang, & Guo, 2008), one’s favored sports team influences one’s sports predictions 





case (Kahan, 2010). More broadly, for cognitive (e.g., Yaniv & Milyavsky, 2007) or 
motivational reasons (e.g., Kahan, 2016; Kunda, 1990), people make judgments anchored around 
their own views, experiences, and identities (Krueger & Clement, 1994; Ross, Greene, & House, 
1977). Nevertheless, scholars are generally cautious about touting social diversity’s benefits, 
emphasizing the complexity of social diversity and its influence on group performance (Eagly, 
2016; Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999; Klein & Harrison, 2007; Mannix & Neale, 2005; Page, 
2007). 
The present work empirically tests connections between social diversity and cognitive 
diversity – specifically, numerical judgments – and then tests social diversity’s impact on group 
accuracy. Distinguishing between social and cognitive diversity is important; if social diversity 
does not significantly correspond to cognitive diversity, then people of different groups will be 
making judgments that are redundant with each other, producing no increase in accuracy. 
Group coordination. In this paper, by “group” I mean the mathematical aggregation of 
individual judgments. The groups refer to collections of people who do not interact as they make 
their judgments, but instead each provide their own best judgment independently. Then, those 
judgments are aggregated (e.g., the mean is calculated) in order to produce the group’s judgment. 
I will refer to these mathematically created, nominal groups as “crowds”. 
There are several reasons one might prefer crowds over using real, deliberating groups. 
First, deliberating groups often fail to reach their full potential (Sunstein & Hastie, 2015). In 
tasks where the information critical to making an accurate judgment is dispersed among different 
group members, people tend to spend more time discussing shared information rather than 
offering up unshared, critical information (Stasser & Stewart, 1992). This, in turn, leads to poor 





the mere aggregates of pre-deliberation views (Gigone & Hastie, 1993) – in other words, 
deliberating groups acted as if they were statistical groups, making deliberation a waste of time. 
Even worse, other studies suggest that deliberation increases confidence in judgment without 
increasing accuracy (Heath & Gonzalez, 1995).  
Various factors can contribute to group failures (for a thorough discussion, see Sunstein 
& Hastie, 2008; Sunstein & Hastie, 2015). Social factors can hinder information sharing and 
critical thinking. For example, dissenting group members may feel too intimidated to share 
information that is incongruent with the majority view, or a group member may assume that 
others already know what she knows (Asch, 1951; Kaplan & Miller, 1987). Value diversity can 
increase conflict and decrease morale (Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999). Cognitive factors can 
play a role, too. For example, people may misremember the critical unique information that they 
share with the group, significantly hampering group accuracy (Lightle, Kagel, & Arkes, 2009). 
Additionally, the order in which information is shared in a group can lead to incorrect 
conclusions based purely on the available information rather than on social pressures (Hung & 
Plott, 2001; Kaplan & Miller, 1987). When working independently, group members can avoid 
these social and cognitive pitfalls that hinder group performance. 
A second reason for using crowds is that they are cheap. When team members all work 
on a problem individually, they each spend more time on task than if they had to convene 
together and discuss a host of matters like how to go about the task and who will be in charge. 
Crowd members can work wherever they wish, so the time and energy costs associated with 
corralling members into a single meeting are avoided.  
A third reason for using such crowds is that they often perform very well relative to 





met, aggregation of a group’s estimates can markedly outperform the average individual group 
member (Larrick & Soll, 2006; Mannes, Soll, & Larrick, 2014). In fact, the less exposure group 
members have to each others’ estimates, the more accurate the aggregate estimate is likely to be 
(Lorenz, Rauhut, Schweitzer, & Helbing, 2011). 
How “crowds” work  
The phenomenon in which a group aggregate outperforms average individuals has been 
called the “wisdom of the crowds” effect (Surowiecki, 2005), hence the use of the term “crowds” 
in this paper. This effect arises from bias cancelation processes that occur during aggregation. In 
numerical judgment, each estimate can be thought of as the sum of three elements: truth, bias 
(systematic error associated with an individual), and random error. Aggregates created by 
averaging are most accurate when their errors are diverse, leading to some overestimation and 
some underestimation in the distribution – that is, when their constituent values “bracket” the 
true value (Davis-Stober, Budescu, Broomell, & Dana, 2015; Herzog & Hertwig, 2014; Larrick 
& Soll, 2006). 
For example, Person A may guess that tomorrow’s high temperature will be around 80 
degrees whereas her colleague, B, may guess it will be around 70. If the true temperature lies 
between both estimates at 75 degrees, the accuracy of the aggregate (taken by averaging) will be 
perfect, although A and B will individually each be off by 5 degrees. With opposing biases 
leading to bracketing, the average estimate outperforms the average individual in the group. Had 
both guesses been biased in the same direction – say, 80 and 78 degrees – the average would not 
perform as well. In fact, the aggregate’s error (4 degrees) would be as great as the expected error 
of randomly choosing A’s estimate or B’s colleague’s estimate; A’s error would have been 5 





Social diversity and crowds 
Estimate diversity is good for crowds, but how can it be consistently achieved? 
Researchers who study wisdom of crowds effects typically randomly sample individuals to 
create aggregates. These random samples include people who are demographically and 
cognitively diverse. Laypeople who wish to harness wisdom of crowds may only have access to 
a few people who are similar to them – family members, coworkers, or friends. Might that social 
similarity correspond to estimate similarity, creating a homophily problem? Should a layperson 
seek out socially diverse “crowds”? Or does cognitive/estimate diversity operate independently 
of social diversity?  
 There is a large literature on diversity and group performance. Much of that work uses 
different definitions of diversity, groups, and performance than those used in this paper. 
Consequently, that work does not directly answer the question presented here. However, I review 
that literature here to summarize general findings, justify the types of social category diversity 
used in the present work, and to clearly show the distinction between the present work and what 
has been done before. 
Types of diversity. General definitions of diversity in the organizational literature are 
often similar: “the distribution of personal attributes among interdependent members of a work 
unit” (Jackson et al., 2003, p. 802), or “the distribution of differences among the members of a 
unit with respect to a common attribute, X, such as tenure, ethnicity, conscientiousness, task 
attitude, or pay” (Harrison & Klein, 2007, p. 1200). Some researchers also discuss the 
configuration of the distribution of those differences as an important feature of diversity 
(Harrison & Klein, 2007; Lau & Murnighan, 1998). More concrete operationalizations of 





immediately apparent demographic features like sex, ethnicity, and age as opposed to deeper, 
less visible types of diversity like informational diversity (Jackson, Joshi, & Erhardt, 2003). 
Diversity in those three demographic categories accounted for 89% of reported diversity effects. 
Ironically, demographic diversity is frequently believed by theorists to be less task-relevant than 
other types of diversity (Pelled, 1996; Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999). Only 24% of reported 
effects examined more task-relevant diversity such as educational diversity.  
Scholars frequently divide operationalizations of diversity into sub-types. In addition to 
the distinction between less task-relevant versus more task-relevant diversity (see also Webber & 
Donahue, 2001), others have similarly divided diversity into “surface level” diversity – that 
which is immediately apparent – versus “deep level” diversity, that which indicates different 
opinions, information, and values (e.g. Phillips & Loyd, 2006). Yet others have examined 
informational diversity (what people know), social category diversity (e.g., demographic 
variables), and value diversity (differences in goals and preferences) (Jehn et al., 1999).  
The distinction in the literature that has the most bearing on the present work is between 
social or demographic diversity (who people are on the outside) and cognitive diversity (who 
people are inside their heads) (Page, 2008). This is similar to the “surface level” and “deep level” 
distinction above. Both are examined in the present work, as is further described below.  
Types of performance. The definition of “performance” also varies between studies and 
disciplines. When studies are conducted on employees in organizational settings, the 
performance measurements can include financial performance (Jackson et al., 2003), evaluations 
from managers and supervisors (Jehn et al., 1999; Pelled et al., 1999), and metrics common in 
the particular industry. For example, one study used NACDA Director’s Cup Points to evaluate 





studies in psychology often use psychological and social performance measures such as 
integrative complexity (Antonio et al., 2004), the quality of solutions in problem solving tasks 
(Homan, van Knippenberg, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2007), reading comprehension (Sommers, 
Warp, & Mahoney, 2008), or quality of group discussions (Phillips & Loyd, 2006; Phillips, 
Mannix, Neale, & Gruenfeld, 2004; Sommers, 2006). 
 Diversity’s effects on performance. Reviews typically conclude that sometimes 
diversity helps task performance, sometimes it hurts, and sometimes it has no effect (Harrison & 
Klein, 2007; Jackson et al., 2003; van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007). This partly arises from 
variation in definitions of diversity and performance. For example, Jehn and colleagues (1999) 
examined the effects of social category diversity, value diversity, and informational diversity on 
team performance across an organization. Performance was provided by the company’s 
departmental records and included measures of team members’ ratings of each other, team 
efficiency, and some objective productivity measures. They found that informational diversity 
was positively associated with performance, but social category diversity had no association with 
performance. Value diversity had a negative relationship with performance. In short, diversity’s 
effects on performance depended on what kind of diversity was being measured. 
In discussing organizational diversity, Webber and Donahue (2001) observed that social 
diversity is usually described as a “double-edged” sword, supposedly making groups perform 
better on tasks while performing worse on measures of group cohesion. They tested the validity 
of that narrative in a meta-analysis that analyzed the effects of highly work-related diversity and 
less work-related diversity on cohesion and performance. They hypothesized, based on the 
common narrative, that task-related diversity such as diversity in people’s functional 





demographic diversity should have no influence on performance. Moreover, demographic 
diversity should decrease cohesion while having minimal effects on actual performance. To their 
surprise, neither type of diversity predicted either outcome measure.  
Newer studies suggest, however, that social diversity can help groups when organizations 
have strategies in place to leverage it. Cunningham (2009) examined whether racial diversity 
predicted athletic department performance in the NCAA as measured by  NACDA Director’s 
Cup points. Results suggested that simply having a racially diverse department did not boost the 
department’s performance. Moreover, having a diversity management strategy did not in and of 
itself boost performance. (Their measure of “strategy” included factors like taking a broad view 
of diversity, valuing diversity, and having open lines of communication.) However, having both 
diversity and a management strategy was associated with higher performance. Thus, diversity 
was beneficial if there were measures in place to capitalize on its strengths. 
Some research also suggests that diversity helps when people think it will help, although 
the effect appears to be linked to informational diversity, not demographic diversity. In a study 
by Homan and colleagues (2007), gender-diverse teams completed a task. Teams espousing pro-
diversity beliefs did not outperform teams that held pro-similarity beliefs. But the authors also 
manipulated how information was distributed such that for some teams it was diversely 
distributed – men had different information than women – and for others it was evenly 
distributed across members regardless of gender. For teams that had diversely distributed 
information, teams with pro-diversity views performed better than teams with pro-similarity 
views. In other words, merely espousing pro-diversity beliefs were insufficient to boost team 





Papers that mathematically model groups have further supported the benefits of cognitive 
diversity in problem solving (Hong & Page, 2004) and forecasting tasks (Davis-Stober et al., 
2015). For example, Davis-Stober and colleagues used a mathematical derivation of the mean 
squared error (MSE) to show that minimizing the covariance between forecasters’ estimates 
reduces error in forecasts. Low covariance between forecasters’ estimates is a form of cognitive 
diversity, as presumably when there is low covariance people would be using different cognitive 
strategies to produce estimates.  
Although the methods and dependent variables in the mathematical modeling literature 
are very different from the approaches taken in most of the organizational literature, 
mathematical models are extremely informative as they support the importance of cognitive 
diversity for group tasks. In the present work, we employ both modeling and empirical work to 
explore social diversity and cognitive diversity’s effects on performance.  
Mechanisms. In the rare cases where social diversity improves group performance, how 
might those improvements arise? Several mechanisms have been suggested. The first, which has 
been called the “trait” method, suggests that people from different social categories have 
different knowledge, skills, and abilities that they bring to the group (McGrath et al., 1995; 
Sommers, 2006). Like pieces in a puzzle, their contributions can be combined to produce a 
superior outcome. Other researchers suggest that people from different social categories do not 
necessarily bring different skills or ideas, but their team members expect them to. These 
expectations and related team behaviors in turn elicit different contributions from team members, 
fulfilling the prophesy predicted by the “trait” method (Eagly & Wood, 1991; McGrath et al., 
1995). Yet others suggest that diversity boosts performance via its effects on group processes 





typically argue that surface demographic diversity is not helpful, only deeper, task-related 
diversity.  
A fourth mechanism occurs via individual processing differences; people in diverse 
groups may individually reason differently than people in homogeneous groups. This idea is 
fairly well-supported. Racially diverse mock juries deliberate longer and recall facts more 
accurately than all-White mock juries, and this improvement is contributed not by Black 
members, as suggested by the “trait” theory, but by White members (Sommers, 2006). The 
author’s interpretation was that when White jurors expected to deliberate with a diverse group, 
they processed information more systematically. The defendant in the mock trial was Black, 
however, so that study did not reveal whether racial diversity helps cognition for all tasks or only 
for those that are race-relevant. In subsequent work, Sommers, Warp & Mahoney (2008) found 
that people in racially diverse (vs. all-White) groups exhibited better memory and 
comprehension for race-relevant information, but not for race-irrelevant information.  
Levine et al. (2014) had participants in a laboratory engage in a trading task. The market 
was either ethnically homogeneous or diverse. Although they worked individually, participants 
in homogeneous markets were less accurate in pricing than participants in diverse markets. The 
authors interpreted the better performance of participants in diverse markets as indicative of 
excess confidence and non-critical thinking present in people navigating homogeneous markets. 
Diversity may have made people more wary and cautious, leading to more careful thinking. 
Also in support of the “individual” mechanism, Loyd, Wang, Phillips, and Lount (2013) 
found positive effects of political diversity on individual pre-meeting deliberation. When 
participants expected to solve a murder mystery in a politically diverse dyad as opposed to a 





complexity and nuance in handling the facts. Relationship focus, or a need to maintain positive 
relationships, was established as a mediator. Individuals expecting to interact in diverse dyads 
exhibited better thinking because they had a lower relationship focus than people in 
homogeneous dyads. In other words, people in homogeneous dyads were more likely to believe 
that having a good relationship with their partner was more important than getting the facts right. 
Although there is general supporting evidence for this mechanism, effects of social 
category diversity on reasoning have not been uniform. Sommers and colleagues (2008) also 
measured reasoning complexity found no reliable evidence that it was boosted by racial 
diversity. Other research has also failed to find a link between experimentally manipulated race 
diversity and individual integrative complexity (Antonio et al., 2004). They only found 
correlational results such that those who reported more inter-racial exposure exhibited more 
complexity in their thinking. 
Implications for the present work. The work in this paper focuses both on “surface-
level” diversity, specifically “social category diversity”, and “deep” diversity which corresponds 
to people’s estimates and biases on judgment tasks. The “surface” diversity must be linked to 
“deep” diversity, because when using crowds it is this deep diversity that helps boost accuracy. 
Based on the emphasis on demographic diversity in previous work, most of the studies 
here measure demographic variables such as age, sex, and ethnicity, as well as less visible 
demographic variables such as educational attainment, political orientation, and religion. In line 
with previous theory, I expected each type of diversity to help crowd accuracy only to the extent 
to which that type of diversity was relevant to the judgment. For example, I thought political 





As for the mechanism by which social diversity produces wiser crowds, only the “trait” 
mechanism described above is relevant. That is, if diversity helps, it will be because people bring 
different “puzzle pieces” to the table. Social diversity may lead to estimate diversity which can 
increase accuracy. Social diversity cannot improve performance via group processes because 
there are none when using crowds, and it cannot be via individual changes in cognition since 
participants have no expectation of interacting with group members, nor do they know anything 
about the people with whom they will be “combined” into a crowd.  
It is also important to note that performance is subjectively assessed for the vast majority 
of the aforementioned research on diversity and performance. There are rarely gold-standard, 
“correct” solutions for the task at hand. Team performance in organizations is typically assessed 
according to the organization’s local methods of assessment, with good scores indicated by 
profitability or efficiency. In jury deliberations (e.g., Sommers, 2006), groups can correctly or 
incorrectly recall facts, and can correctly or incorrectly interpret the law (Ellsworth, 1989), but 
whether that recollection translates into proper judgment can be impossible to know. Some rare 
tasks are designed with correct answers (Phillips et al., 2004), but researchers have at times 
intentionally modified such tasks so that there is no correct answer (Loyd, Wang, Phillips, & 
Lount, 2013).  
By contrast, the work in this dissertation is specifically interested in objective crowd 
performance, so questions must have a correct answer. Participants give numerical judgments in 
order to precisely state their views, and these are compared against a known correct value to 
determine performance. The implications of this point are further discussed in the introduction of 
Chapter III, but here I merely note this important distinction. Treating a problem as solvable 





(Stasser & Stewart, 1992), thus it is unknown how these diversity effects with “softer” 
performance measures shed light on diversity effects on concrete judgment tasks. 
Three research questions 
This dissertation addresses three main research questions related to the layperson’s 
practical use of aggregate judgments. First, a theoretical question is discussed: Under what 
conditions are socially diverse crowds more accurate than socially homogeneous crowds in 
numerical judgment tasks? A model described in Chapter II demonstrates that the answer 
depends on how much social factors bias judgment and also on where the truth lies relative to 
different groups’ judgments. 
Second, how likely are those conditions to materialize in real life? The model presented 
in Chapter II sets the bar high – two conditions must both be true for social diversity to produce 
benefits above and beyond using homogeneous crowds. Seven studies in Chapter III examine 
people’s judgments on a wide variety of tasks. Results suggest that it is unlikely that commonly 
used social factors matter for crowd wisdom. Some homogeneous crowds are wiser than other 
homogeneous crowds, but diverse crowds are typically not wiser than the average homogeneous 
crowd. 
Third, do laypeople in the United States have realistic expectations about the benefits of 
using socially diverse crowds? Two sets of studies explore this question in Chapter IV. The first 
studies examine whether people believe socially diverse crowds are wiser. They also gauge how 
much wiser people think those crowds are on a variety of judgment tasks. The second set of 
studies present behavioral implications of those beliefs. They test whether people prefer advice 
from diverse sources over homogeneous ones, and whether they are willing to pay more money 






Conditions for Diversity Accuracy Gains 
Modeling Social Diversity and Cognitive Diversity 
I modeled the effect of crowd type, homogeneous or diverse, on accuracy. Various 
hypothetical “datasets” were generated following different parameters to test the effects of 
diversity on judgment accuracy. In each simulation, hypothetical estimates from different 
datasets were aggregated in a diverse or homogeneous manner, then compared against a 
hypothetical true value.  
The model demonstrates three conditions that must be met in order for socially diverse 
aggregates to substantially outperform homogeneous aggregates. When all three conditions are 
met, aggregates of diverse estimates (from different groups) are more accurate than aggregates of 
homogeneous estimates (from the same group). First, the social characteristic of concern must 
systematically bias judgments. If, for example, men and women do not reliably make different 
types of judgments for the question at hand, then it would make no difference whether one 
employs aggregates of mixed gender or only one gender group. Second, the group difference 
must be large enough to have a meaningful impact on the bracketing rate and, by extension, 
accuracy. Third, the criterion – or correct answer – must lie between the average estimate of each 
group. In other words, the distribution of estimates from each social group must “bracket” the 






I modeled the wisdom of homogeneous and diverse crowds from two simulated, 
hypothetical social groups to demonstrate the above requirements. In the model, the effect size of 
“social diversity” on judgment was manipulated, as was the location of the truth relative to the 
group’s guesses. As these parameters varied, the relative accuracy of diverse (vs. homogeneous) 
crowds varied. The manipulations, which I refer to as “effect size” and “bracketing”, are 
described below. 
Effect size. The model creates crowds by sampling from two normal distributions. Each 
distribution represents the population estimates from a homogeneous social group. For the sake 
of illustration, imagine one distribution represents estimates from Ohio State fans (OSU) and one 
distribution represents estimates from University of Michigan fans (UM). Theoretically they 
could be estimating anything, but for consistency, imagine they are forecasting how many points 
OSU will score in an upcoming game. In the model, creating a homogeneous social crowd means 
drawing estimates from only one of the distributions – for example, asking only UM fans for 
their estimates. Creating a diverse social crowd means drawing estimates from both distributions 
– asking 4 OSU fans and 4 UM fans for their estimates. I used aggregates of 8 based on evidence 
that wisdom of crowds effects are quite effective even for small crowds and accuracy benefits 
have diminishing returns as crowd size grows (Yaniv, 2004). Moreover, I wanted to simulate the 
size of a crowd a typical person might poll for advice – few people would have the resources or 
desire to poll over a handful of people when making a judgment. 
How much the groups’ estimates overlap predicts how much one stands to gain by 
employing a diverse crowd versus a homogeneous crowd. If the effect of social group 





almost to the point of being the same. Diverse crowds will on average be nearly indistinguishable 
from homogeneous crowds. If the effect of group membership on estimates is large (r = .8), the 
OSU and UM distributions will be highly distinct. Therefore, crowds from each homogeneous 
population will be distinct, and diverse crowds will on average yield an estimate that falls 
between the estimate of the two homogeneous groups.  
Using R (R Core Team, 2016), four pairs of distributions were created to represent the 
following effect sizes:  r = .8, d = 2.6, (MOSU = 58 and MUM = 26), r = .6, d = 1.6, (MOSU = 52 and 
MUM= 32), r = .3, d = .6, (MOSU = 46 and MUM = 38), r = .1, d = .2, (MOSU = 43 and MUM = 41). 
All standard deviations were 12.25, and the midpoint between both distributions’ means is 
always 421. Each distribution contained 10,000 “estimates” from that social group. Figure II.1 
shows the distributions. To simulate crowds, I averaged 8 guesses from homogeneous vs. diverse 
sampling as described above. Twenty thousand homogeneous crowds were created (10,000 OSU 
crowds and 10,000 UM crowds) and 10,000 diverse crowds were created. 
Bracketing. How well each crowd performs also depends on where the true value lies. 
Imagine UM’s crowds predicted 38 points on average while OSU’s crowds predicted 46 points. 
Diverse crowds on average predict the midpoint: 42. If OSU scores 7 points, the wisest crowd is 
a homogeneous one comprised of only UM fans. Diverse crowds have middling performance, 
and homogeneous OSU crowds would fare the worst. If OSU scores 42 points, the diverse crowd 
will be the most accurate, while UM crowds underestimate and OSU crowds overestimate the 
outcome. More generally, diverse crowds will be wiser than homogeneous crowds when the 
                                                 
1 The numbers are arbitrary; other values can be used to create distributions at each effect size. I simply chose 42 
because that is how many points OSU really scored in the 2015 match against Michigan, and 12.25 was roughly the 





outcome lies near the midpoint between OSU’s and UM’s respective mean guesses. The farther 
away the truth is from the midpoint, the less of an advantage diversity offers. 
In the model, accuracy is the absolute difference between each crowd’s estimate and the 
true value (i.e., absolute error). Each crowd’s performance is compared against varied 
hypothetical “true” values. In other words, crowd accuracy is re-computed at each hypothetical 
“true” value. Accuracy is first computed with the truth set to the midpoint, 42 (see bold black 
vertical line on the left of each plot, Figure II.1). It is then re-computed for each crowd at each 
effect size when the truth is set to 43, 44, 45, and so forth until 62, or 20 points away from the 
midpoint, towards MOSU and ultimately passing it.  








Note. This figure illustrates hypothetical distributions of two groups’ estimates, Ohio State fans 
(OSU) and University of Michigan fans (UM). As labeled in the figure, each pair of distributions 
reflects a different effect size of group membership on judgment, from r = .1 to r = .8. Vertical 
black lines depict where the truth may lie relative to people’s estimates in the simulations. 
Results 
Figure II.2 models the accuracy of homogeneous and diverse crowds at different effect 
sizes for different degrees of bracketing. The y-axis denotes error; lower error indicates higher 
accuracy. The x-axis depicts variation in the true value, or bracketing. At the farthest point on the 
left (x = 0), the true value is set to lie at the midpoint between OSU and UM’s guesses (refer to 
Figure II.1., left black line). It deviates 0 points from the midpoint. As x increases in 1-point 
increments, the true value shifts towards MOSU, ultimately surpassing it (again see Figure II.1, the 
line trends right).  
What happens to homogeneous crowd error depends on effect size and location of the 
truth. In Figure II.2, OSU crowd error decreases as the true value shifts towards MOSU, but the 
error begins to increase when the true value shifts past and away from MOSU. UM error 
continually increases as the true value shifts away from MUM. OSU and UM crowd errors are 
similar at small effects (r = .1) and very different at large effects (r = .8).  
Diverse crowds are sometimes more accurate than the homogeneous crowds. When social 
identity only weakly correlates with judgment (r = .1, Cohen’s d = .2), diverse crowds of 8 are 
not notably more accurate than homogeneous crowds. Social identity must have a moderate to 
large effect on judgment for diverse crowds to outperform homogeneous crowds. When r = .3 (d 
= .6) and above, diverse crowds are the wisest crowds if the bracketing condition is met. (Note 
that the diversity gain is still very small at r = .3). But when the true value moves more than 50% 
closer to the mean of one group, the diversity advantage is lost, regardless of effect size. For 





Once the truth moves 5 points closer to MOSU the diverse group ceases to be the most accurate, 
but it is still more accurate than the average homogeneous group. When the truth moves past 
MOSU – that is, 10 points away from the midpoint in this case – the diverse crowd is as accurate 
as the average homogeneous crowd. It is less accurate than OSU and more accurate than UM. 
Shaded regions in the figure indicate diversity advantages over homogeneous crowds (see Figure 
II.2 caption).  




Note: On the x-axis, 0 indicates the truth is at the midpoint between the means of OSU and UM 
estimates (perfect “bracketing”). Increases on the axis indicate greater violation of the bracketing 
condition. Darker shaded regions indicate where diverse crowds outperform both homogeneous 





homogeneous crowd. Unshaded regions indicate where diverse crowds perform as well as the 
average homogeneous crowd.  
 In summary, the graphs all demonstrate that the accuracy of diverse groups decreases as 
the outcome value shifts away from the center of the two distributions. Small effects are 
especially susceptible to a loss of diversity benefits when bracketing is violated. Across all 
groups, when the bracketing condition is violated such that the criterion falls “outside” of the 
means of the two groups, the accuracy of diverse groups falls between the accuracy of the more 
accurate group and the less accurate group. 
 In Chapter III, a series of studies tests whether the diversity advantages observed in the 
model can be detected in real decision tasks. Socially diverse and homogeneous crowds are 
created from people’s estimates and their performance is compared. Consistent with the model, 
when conditions for a diversity advantage are not met, diverse crowds are merely as wise as 






Observed Diversity Accuracy Gains 
The simulations show that social diversity can make crowds wiser when the social factor 
is at least moderately associated with judgment and bracketing occurs. How often are those 
conditions met? Large effects of social identity or values have been found for some judgment 
tasks, but these typically ask about polarized attitudes (e.g., Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009) or 
questions for which the truth is subjective or cannot be known for certain (e.g., Kahan, Hoffman, 
& Braman, 2009). Such effect sizes may not represent the typical effect of social identity on 
judgments about matters of fact. They may also not represent the typical effect size in social 
psychology more generally.  
A meta-analysis spanning 100 years of psychological research suggested that the “overall 
average” effect size in social psychology is r = .21 (Richard, Bond, & Stokes-Zoota, 2003). The 
most prevalent social factor the authors discussed was gender. Some effects of gender on social 
behavior and attitudes were moderate; women gaze at others more (.29) and are more empathetic 
(.37) than men (22). They are more likely to support the feminist movement (.39). But most 
gender effects were much smaller. For example, gender differences in social attribution were all 
smaller than .08. Female jurors are slightly harsher than male jurors in sexual assault cases (.16). 
Men are slightly more likely than women to dislike gays (.04 to .19). Boys are more competitive 
than girls by a small margin (.03), men have higher self-esteem than women (.06). Finally, race 





Americans (.10). It is notable that of the few judgment questions studied, none were about 
matters of fact. 
I am unaware of a body of research that systematically tests for social differences in 
numerical judgments about matters of fact as opposed to attitudes and subjective beliefs. It is 
reasonable to anticipate that such effects would be even smaller than the effects of social identity 
on attitude judgments and social behavior, because giving numerical answers to factual questions 
imposes a type of accountability on the respondent. One might say, “Men are a lot taller than 
women,” but when pressed to define what “a lot” means, one is faced with the possibility of 
objective assessment of one’s accuracy. People’s biases are constrained by reality and often 
diminish when there is accountability for one’s answers (Kunda, 1990; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; 
Windschitl, Smith, Rose, & Krizan, 2010). 
Studies III.1 – III.7  
 The present studies aim to address that gap in the literature by systematically looking for 
strong, significant correlations between social factors and people’s numerical judgments. 
Method 
For Studies 1-6, participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) 
platform. For Study 7, participants from diverse ethnic backgrounds were recruited via targeted 
e-mails from the university’s registrar’s office, followed by snowball sampling. Demographics 
from each study are summarized in Table III.1. Social factors were measured and correlated 
against numerical judgments in diverse domains. “Social diversity” referred to these 





background, educational attainment, religion, and political orientation. I also examined fans from 
opposing teams in one study.  



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note. Education was measured on a 6-point scale (1 = Some high school, 2 = Completed high 
school, 3 = Some college, 4 = Completed college, 5 = Some post-graduate education, 6 = Post-
graduate degree). Political orientation was assessed on a 7-point scale (1 = Very Liberal, 7 = 
Very Conservative). 
Football fans from opposing teams guessed how many points each team would score in a 
rivalry game in Study 1. In Studies 2 and 4, respectively, people of diverse political backgrounds 
predicted how presidential candidates would perform in primary and national elections. In Study 
3, people of diverse political backgrounds guessed the level of national support for 6 different 
political statements. They also gave likelihood ratings for presidential candidates winning the 
upcoming Iowa caucus. In Study 5, participants guessed the popularity ratings of 24 different 
books. In Studies 6 and 7, people forecasted the probability of outcomes for up to 40 diverse 
news stories in the United States and abroad (e.g., “What is the likelihood of Chinese official 
GDP growth exceeding 6.3% in the first quarter?” “What is the likelihood of Leonardo DiCaprio 
winning an Oscar?”). In Study 7, they also predicted medal awards for the 2016 Olympics and 
forecasted future stock prices. Table III.2 summarizes the information for each study. 
Table III.2. Study Summaries 
Study  Judgment task Sample question 
1 Guess scores of 8 college football games in 
2015 
For the Ohio State Buckeyes vs the Michigan 
Wolverines game, what will be the final score? 
(Enter your guess for each team below by typing 
in numbers) 
2 Forecast the percentage of votes that 
Republican and Democratic candidates will 
receive in Ohio and New Hampshire 
primaries, 2016 presidential election 
What percentage of votes will Bernie Sanders 
receive in the New Hampshire primary election? 
(Answer must range between 0 and 100. Type in 
your number below, no % needed.) 
3 Estimate the percentage of Americans that 
support a variety of polarizing political views 
What percentage of Americans favor forming a 
federal database to track gun sales? 
 
4 Predict what percentage of votes Hillary 
Clinton and Donald Trump will each receive 
in 10 states in 2016 United States 
presidential election. 
What percentage of votes will Hillary Clinton 





5 Guess the popularity rating of 24 books, 
previously tested among 50 MTurk users. 
What was the average interest rating for this 
book? (To Kill a Mockingbird, by Harper Lee) 
6 Estimate the likelihood of 40 diverse, 
domestic and international events occurring. 
Events derived from news stories 
What is the likelihood of Myanmar's ruling 
government signing a peace agreement with rebel 
groups? 
What is the likelihood of California legalizing the 
recreational use of marijuana? 
What is the likelihood of Leonardo DiCaprio 
winning an Oscar? 
7 Three judgment tasks:  
(a) predicting stock prices 
(b) predicting Olympic performance 
(c) predicting news events outcomes 
(a) Click on where you predict this stock will be 
on June 19 2016. (Google price trend image) 
(b) In the 2016 Olympics, how many medals will 
Brazil win in Judo? 
(c) What is the likelihood that Chinese authorities 
will officially loosen new trade restrictions with 
North Korea? 
 
Performance was lightly incentivized across most studies to promote recruitment and 
encourage attention. Top performers in the MTurk studies could earn between 2 and 10 dollars 
for their performance. For Study 7, 4 randomly chosen participants won $50 Amazon gift cards. 
The top-performing participant won a $100 Amazon gift card. Further details on the methods for 
each study are in Appendix A. 
Results 
Effect of social factor on judgment. To measure the effect of social identity on 
estimates, I correlated respondents’ numerical judgments with social factors measured in each 
study. Where social factors were categorical, the categories were collapsed into two levels (e.g., 
religious = 1 and non-religious = 0, as opposed to 1 value per religion). In those dichotomous 
cases, point-biserial correlations were computed.  
Hardly any strong relationships emerged when all judgments were correlated against all 
measured social variables. Out of 965 correlations, sixty percent were weaker than r ± .1 and 
96% were weaker than r ± .2. Fewer than 1% of the correlations were .3 or stronger. These 





crowds to outperform homogeneous crowds. All correlations significant at the p < .01 level are 
reported in Appendix B. 
Homogeneous and diverse crowds. Despite the small observed association between 
social diversity and estimate diversity, could diverse crowds be wiser for the tasks that had the 
largest correlations between social identity and judgment? I compared the accuracy of socially 
homogeneous and diverse crowds from people’s answers in these studies. To give diverse groups 
the best chance of outperforming homogeneous groups, I used tasks that showed biggest effects 
of social identity on judgment. They included sports predictions, political questions, and guesses 
about popular interest in various books. The social identity factors analyzed were likewise 
diverse, including the sports teams people cheered for, their age, sex, political orientation, and 
whether they were religious. The observed r across questions for each task are shown in Table 
III.3. 
From people’s estimates, one thousand crowds were created by averaging 8 random 
people’s estimates. Diverse crowds included 4 people from each social category (e.g., 4 liberals 
and 4 conservatives). Likewise, homogeneous crowds were created for each social category (e.g., 
1,000 crowds including 8 randomly chosen liberals and 1,000 crowds including 8 randomly 
chosen conservatives). Individual and crowd accuracy were assessed by comparing mean 
absolute errors (MAE). People often do not know a priori which, if any, homogeneous crowd 
will be the most accurate, so the simulated diverse crowds are compared against the average 
homogeneous crowd’s performance – that is, the expected error of randomly choosing 1 
homogeneous crowd.  
It may be seen in Table III.3 that both homogeneous and diverse crowds typically 





type didn’t matter; diverse crowds usually performed about as well as the average homogeneous 
crowd. The largest effect of social diversity on judgment was for sports: people’s favored sports 
team had a moderate effect on their predictions for an upcoming game. However, the bracketing 
condition was not met; the game’s outcome surprised everyone: Ohio State did better than most 
people expected and Michigan did worse. This resulted in diverse crowds performing about as 
well as homogeneous crowds. For task 4 – predicting presidential candidate performance – social 
diversity decreased error the most. The socially diverse crowd, comprised of liberals and 
conservatives, was typically 1 percentage point closer to the true outcome than the average 
homogeneous crowd comprised of only liberals or only conservatives. This amounted to a 10 
percent decrease in error, from 8.91 to 7.99. No such advantage for diversity was observed in the 
other tasks.  
It should be noted that participants in the sports study only made 2 target judgments – 1 
per opposing team. The other teams were not Ohio or Michigan teams and so a bias was not 
present there. A better test of the bracketing condition for sports would involve multiple 
judgments as in Studies 2 through 7, because the failure to bracket in this single game may have 
simply been a fluke. In another study, I therefore asked 110 fans to guess the points scored 
across 20 past games for a total of 40 judgments. However, the effect of favored team on 
judgment disappeared, with r not significantly differing from 0. Perhaps past games are not as 
compelling as an immediate upcoming game, or perhaps making multiple judgments reduces 
bias as people reason about the question repeatedly. Regardless of the reason, diverse crowds 
would not outperform homogeneous crowds in either sports study. 





















1 Team 0.36 14.49 (5.25) 13.6 13.52 
2 Religiosity 0.13 14.46 (4.65) 11.85 11.79 




0.21 14.52 (6.70) 8.91 7.99 
5 Age 0.1 2.24 (.57) 1.18 1.14 
5 Sex 0.1 2.24 (.57) 1.07 1.06 
 
Note. “Social identity” refers to the social factor that was most strongly associated with people’s 
answers. The r is the average (absolute) correlation between that social category and answers. 
Average individual error is the average of absolute error across all questions in the task. The 
tasks were: (1) predict points in Ohio State vs Michigan game, (2) predict percentage of votes 8 
presidential candidates would receive in 2 state primaries, (3) guess what percentage of 
Americans support each of 6 political statements, (4) predict what percentage of votes Clinton 
and Trump would each win in 10 states in 2016 presidential election (5) guess the popularity 
rating that 24 diverse books received in a previous study. 
 
 “Very homogeneous” and “very diverse” crowds. A stronger test of the diversity 
hypothesis would be to test the accuracy of “very homogeneous” groups against extremely 
diverse groups. For example, a group of religious, White Republicans is more homogeneous than 
a group of religious people because its members overlap on multiple social categories. I 
examined such crowds’ performance for the same tasks in Table III.3 except for the football task, 





For these analyses, very homogeneous pools of participants were created by including 
people who overlapped on 2 or 3 social dimensions. Six homogeneous pools were created for 
each study based on factors that could reasonably be argued as relevant to the judgment (see 
Table III.4). For example, during American election cycles, news media frequently refer to age, 
sex, ethnicity, social class, and political orientation as factors that divide people into distinct 
voting blocks. So homogeneous pools were created around those criteria. The pools were 
restricted by sample size; only those for which at least 30 participants met the criteria were used 
(with two exceptions, see note in Table III.4). To create a diverse pool from which to simulate 
crowds, 40 participants were randomly chosen from the complete dataset of each study except in 
Study 3. Given the larger N, I was able to create larger homogeneous pools, so the diverse pool 
included 100 participants.  
Table III.4. Socially Homogeneous Groups 
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Note. All crowds except 2 were simulated from pools of at least 30 people. G2 for the book task 
(men over 40) was simulated from a pool of 22 men, and G6 (ethnic minority women) was 
sampled from a pool of 29 due to limited representation of those groups in the larger sample. 
Homogeneous and diverse aggregates of 8 people were created by randomly sampling 
people 1,000 times. Accuracy was again assessed as MAE. Diverse MAE and homogeneous 
MAE were compared with the homogeneous groups averaged together. 
 Diverse crowds did not consistently perform much better than the average homogeneous 
crowd. For the primary election task, MAEDIVERSE = 11.56 and MAEHOMOG = 11.96. For the 
popular political opinion task, MAEDIVERSE = 9.40 and MAEHOMOG = 9.61. For the national 
presidential election task, MAEDIVERSE = 9.09 and MAEHOMOG = 8.89. These differences are 
minute – less than 1 point on a 101-point scale as participants estimated percentages. And for the 
book popularity task, both the diverse and homogeneous crowd MAE equaled 1.12. 
Disaggregating the performance of homogeneous crowds reveals some fluctuation in 
crowd accuracy. Performance broken down by crowd type can be seen in Figure III.1. Given 
variation in homogeneous crowd performance, choosing a diverse crowd can be considered a risk 
reduction strategy, even if it is unlikely to be the best-performing group. A diverse crowd is 
essentially guaranteed a moderately good performance, whereas choosing a homogeneous crowd 
introduces the possibility of doing relatively well and also the possibility of doing relatively 
poorly. If one has no basis for choosing one homogeneous crowd over another, a diverse crowd 
is a “safe” choice. Nevertheless, homogeneous group performance does not vary substantially.  






Note. G1 always represents the diverse crowds. G2 to G7 represent the homogeneous groups as 
described in Table III.4. For example, for the primary election, presidential election, and popular 
political opinion tasks, G2 refers to White men who did not complete college. For the book 
rating task, G2 refers to men over 40 years old. In all graphs, the y-axis indicates error. Lower 
values mean higher accuracy on the task.  
Discussion 
 As the model in Chapter II demonstrated, social diversity can theoretically make crowds 
wiser, but only to the extent to which it corresponds to diversity in estimates. Moreover, those 
diverse estimates must also bracket the true value in at least some realizations of the judgment 
outcome. The work in Chapter III suggests that small crowds can be wiser than individuals, but it 
often does not matter whether the crowd is homogeneous or diverse along demographic 
dimensions. 
 These results suggest several conclusions. First, for numerical judgments, socially 














































In the present research, the diversity between groups was relatively small and the diversity 
within groups was relatively large. Second, people who expect social groups to think very 
differently for these types of judgments may be erroneously stereotyping, expecting variation 
within groups to be small and variation between groups to be large. Our work supports scholarly 
and scientific exhortations to avoid stereotyping (Page, 2007). People might achieve this by 
realizing that, for numerical judgments about matters of fact, there is a lot of cognitive diversity 
within homogeneous social groups (Judd, Ryan, & Park, 1991). For example, people ought to 
consider that not all women think alike, not all liberals think alike, and so forth. 
These results do not mean that no social factors correlate with any types of judgment. As 
I previously discussed, in many cases social identity can influence more subjective judgment. 
These results merely suggest that according to the operationalizations of social diversity in the 
present work, which are consistent with many popular conceptions of “diversity”, there is only a 
weak correlation between demographic factors and numerical judgment. Any measure that 
effectively taps into people’s signature cognitive biases would be a better proxy for cognitive 
diversity than the demographic variables that are all too commonly used. 
Chapter IV addresses remaining questions about laypeople’s expectations regarding 
social diversity and crowd wisdom. Do they expect diversity to be advantageous, and why? The 
studies also test to what extent people act on those expectations – are they more likely to choose 
diverse crowds when seeking advice on a judgment task, and are they willing to pay more for 
diverse crowds than homogeneous crowds? 






Lay Expectations of Diversity Gains 
These studies explored whether and why people expect socially diverse groups to be 
more accurate than homogeneous groups in numerical judgment tasks. In the United States, 
social diversity is often promoted on practical grounds. Diverse groups are expected to 
outperform homogeneous groups on a variety of tasks (e.g., Galinsky et al., 2015). As discussed 
in Chapter I, in some contexts social diversity does make individual judgments more accurate 
(Levine et al., 2014), or it can lead to higher-quality deliberations that precede judgments (Loyd 
et al., 2013; Phillips et al., 2004; Sommers, 2006; Sommers et al., 2008). But studies conducted 
on organizational teams overall find no direct benefit of demographic, social category diversity 
on team performance (Webber & Donahue, 2001). Moreover, as Studies III.1-III.7 suggest, 
social diversity is unlikely to provide accuracy benefits for socially diverse crowds in numerical 
judgment tasks. 
For the studies in Chapter IV, I hypothesized that people would generally think social 
diversity boosts aggregate accuracy (H1), partially because social diversity is increasingly 
viewed positively in American public discourse and there are several plausible arguments for 
why it may be beneficial for group performance, as reviewed in the Introduction. In addition to 
testing H1, I tested potential sources of inaccuracy. People might overestimate the effect size of 
social identity on judgment (H2a) or they might assume that estimates from different groups are 





benefits may unfold like this: “People of different social backgrounds have different ways of 
thinking (H2a) which will bias them towards different sides of the truth (H2b), so diverse groups 
are more accurate than homogeneous groups (H1) because their errors can cancel out.” 
 Behavioral outcomes of these beliefs were also tested. If people do expect socially 
diverse crowds to be wiser than homogeneous ones, are they more likely to choose diverse 
crowds when seeking advice on a judgment task? Does their choice depend not only on the 
diverse nature of the advice, but also on the cost of obtaining that advice? The third hypothesis 
states that if the cost of obtaining diverse and homogeneous advice is equal, people will prefer 
advice from diverse crowds when making numerical judgments (H3). The fourth hypothesis 
states that people will value the accuracy gains that they imagine for diverse advice, so they will 
be willing to pay more for diverse advice than for homogeneous advice (H4). 
 Studies IV.1-2 test people’s beliefs about the relative accuracy of diverse crowds (H1 – 
H2). In those studies, people imagine the average estimates that different social groups might 
give on a judgment task. They report how accurate homogeneous and diverse crowds might be 
for those particular tasks. Studies 1a, 1b, and 1c employ a correlational design while Study 2 
experimentally manipulates bias and bracketing to test its effects on people’s beliefs about 
diverse crowds. Studies IV.3-IV.5 examine advice choice and willingness to pay for advice to 
examine the behavioral implications of diversity beliefs (H3 and H4).   
Study IV.1 
In Studies 1a-1c, people guessed the numerical judgments of people from particular 
social groups to test H2a and H2b. The questions measured people’s imagined effect of social 





accurate for the judgment at hand, to test H1. If they thought diverse crowds would be more 
accurate than homogeneous ones, they also indicated by how much.  
For Studies 1a and 1b, I simulated homogeneous and diverse crowds created from 
people’s imagined estimates. For example, I took what they thought liberals and conservatives 
would predict for an election and treated them as real estimates. I then examined how accurate 
these imagined homogeneous and diverse crowds were in order to see if people’s inferences from 
their assumptions were justified. In other words, if the bias that people imagined were real, then 
would diverse crowds be wiser than homogeneous crowds? The questions across these studies 
are summarized in Table IV.1. 
Table IV.1. Summary of Studies IV.1a – IV.1c 
Study  Domain Groups  Target judgment Sample Questions 
1a Politics Conservatives vs. liberals Percentage of votes 
that Hillary Clinton 
and Ted Cruz got in 
their respective 
primaries in Ohio 
What outcome do you think conservatives 
(liberals) predicted, on average, for 
Hillary? 
 
1a Sports Ohio State University 
football fans vs. 
University of Michigan 
football fans 
Number of points 
Ohio State and 
Michigan each scored 
in their 2015 game 
How many points do you think Ohio State 





Men vs. women  Attendance at a local 
music show featuring 
a young woman 
playing acoustic folk 
music 
Out of all the festival attendees we poll 
today, what percentage will plan to attend 
this event? 
What prediction do you think women 
(men), on average, would make for 
question 3? 
1c Art fair Men, women, out of 
town visitors, 
participating artists 
How many artists 
were participating in 
the 2016 State St. art 
fair in Ann Arbor, MI 
How many artists do you think are 
participating in the State Street 2016 art 
fair? 
How would men (women/ out of town 
visitors/ participating artists), on average, 
answer question 1? 
Note. The “groups” column describes groups for which participants guessed their average 







 In Study 1a, (N = 201,  Mage = 36.41, S.D. = 12.97, 40% male), MTurk participants 
answered questions related to politics and sports. Thirty two percent completed some college, 
34% completed college, 21% completed some or all of a graduate degree. Fifty one percent 
identified as liberal to some degree, 24% were moderate, and 25% were conservative to some 
degree. The sample was 72% White, 12% Black, 6% East Asian, 5% Latino(a), and 6% mixed or 
“Other”. 
Imagined group estimates. Respondents’ first task was to guess people’s predictions 
from previous studies. For each question, participants were given the actual outcome and then 
guessed the mean predictions of different groups. For the politically themed questions, 
respondents guessed what percentage of votes conservatives and liberals predicted for Hillary 
Clinton in Ohio’s primary in 2016. They also guessed what percentage of votes each group 
predicted for Ted Cruz. (These candidates were chosen because at the time of the study, both 
were faring relatively well in the presidential race and Cruz seemed to be a slightly less 
controversial candidate than Donald Trump.)  
For the sports themed questions, respondents guessed Ohio State and Michigan fans’ 
predictions of Ohio State’s score in the 2015 Ohio State/Michigan football game. They also 
guessed each group’s prediction for Michigan’s score. All participants completed political and 
sports questions, with the order of the themes counterbalanced and with randomized questions 
within each condition. Responses were typed into an open-ended text box. 
Choice of optimal crowd. After guessing, participants were told that averaging estimates 
in different ways can often yield relatively accurate predictions. I asked them what kind of 





participants could choose one of the following: (a) “Overall, averaging guesses from similar 
people (only one political party) will be most accurate,” (b) “Overall, averaging guesses from 
diverse people (different political parties) will be most accurate,” or (c) “Overall, the 
performance of similar vs diverse groups will be about the same.” Order was randomized across 
options.  
Estimated accuracy gains. If participants chose the homogeneous or diverse option, 
they were then asked by how much that option would reduce error as compared to the other 
option. Responses were given on a scale with 20% increments: “It’s 90% closer to the truth,” 
“It’s 70% closer to the truth,” and so on through 10%. 
 I quizzed participants on the instructions after the second portion to check how much they 
understood them. Eighty four percent of respondents correctly indicated that, among other 
things, they were asked to “guess what percentage of votes liberals predicted for Hillary.” 
Incorrect answers (“guess the number of votes Hillary got” and “guess what percentage of 
liberals voted for Hillary”) were chosen by 5% and 11% of participants, respectively. Filtering 
out participants who did not correctly answer this question did not alter estimates in any 
substantial way, so the analyses reported here do not use this filter. 
 Finally, participants completed a brief demographic questionnaire indicating their age, 
sex, ethnicity, educational attainment, and political ideology. 
Method, 1b 
In Study 1b, participants encountered a less adversarial domain – namely, they estimated 
the predictions of men and women for attendance at a young woman’s folk performance. 





planning survey. Sixty four people (49% male, Mage = 33.16, S.D. = 15.20) completed the survey 
in exchange for a $1 coupon for a local coffee shop. They first read a brief event description 
taken from the official event website. The event was a free music performance scheduled for that 
Friday. I chose it specifically because it appeared feminine and appealing to women as it featured 
a young, female artist. On the survey, a flower embellished the event description to reinforce the 
feminine aspect of the event. Appealing to one demographic makes it quite reasonable to believe 
that men and women would give different estimates. 
After reading the description, participants indicated their own interest in the event (1 = 
Not at all interested, 4 = Extremely interested) and whether they planned on going (1 = 
Definitely won’t, 4 = Definitely will). Then, they guessed what percentage of our respondents 
would plan to attend the event.  
Imagined group estimates. In counterbalanced order, participants then guessed what the 
average attendance estimate would be from our female respondents and from our male 
respondents. 
Choice of optimal crowd. They then guessed what type of group would be most 
accurate. They read: “We want to get an accurate prediction of turnout for the event. We’ll ask 
people to guess what the turnout will be, and average their answers. To be most accurate, should 
we ask: (a) Just women for their estimates, (b) Just men for their estimates, (c) Both women and 
men for their estimates, (d) All of the above will be equally accurate.”  
Estimated accuracy gains. They were then asked to indicate how much more accurate 
their selection would be: “If you chose a, b, or c (question 6), how much more accurate do you 





30% closer, (c) 50% closer, (d) 70% closer, (e) 90% closer to the true number.” After giving 
their answer, participants indicated their age and sex. 
Method, 1c 
 Sixty six art fair attendees participated in exchange for a $1 coupon to a local coffee 
shop. One person gave mathematically impossible error estimates (i.e., error estimates were 
larger than target estimates), so responses from 65 participants were included in analyses (Mage = 
48.03, S.D. = 17.07, 40% were male, 22% were local residents). Everyone first answered the 
question, “How many artists do you think are participating in the State Street 2016 art fair?”  
 Imagined group estimates. They then answered four questions about how four different 
groups would have answered question one: “How would (participating artists/ out of town 
visitors/ men/ women), on average, answer question 1?” They answered by filling in a blank: 
“_______ artists.” 
 Choice of optimal crowd. In this study, rather than choosing the wisest crowd, 
participants indicated by how much each crowd type would err. The instructions stated: “Below, 
take a guess at how accurate we’d be if we averaged guesses from each of the following groups.” 
They then indicated their error estimates in table form as shown in Figure IV.1. The researcher 
answered any questions that participants had while they completed the surveys. 






Note. To make the task as clear as possible, we asked participants to answer the question in  table 
format as depicted here. 
Finally, participants indicated their age, sex, and whether they lived in the town that was 
hosting the art fair. 
Results 
Diverse groups are best (H1). H1 was supported for the domains in which people had 
lay theories about bias – specifically, politics, sports, and women’s folk shows. Most people 
thought diverse groups would be the optimal crowd. In Study 1a, 58% of people thought diverse 
aggregates would be the most accurate in political domain and 56% of people thought diverse 
aggregates would be the most accurate in the sports domain. In Study 1b, 84% of people thought 
diverse aggregates would be more accurate than homogeneous aggregates in predicting concert 
attendance. 
Estimated accuracy gains were high. Participants who thought that diverse crowds were 
optimal said such crowds would decrease error by 57% (political) and 55% (sports) as compared 
to polling a homogeneous group. In Study 1b, people who thought that diverse crowds were 





In Study 1c, I did not ask participants to choose which type of group would be most 
accurate in estimating number of artists. Instead, I asked them to estimate the error of diverse and 
homogeneous groups. People did not expect diverse groups to have lower error than 
homogeneous groups. As will be seen below, people did not expect different social groups to be 
biased, unlike in Studies 1a and 1b. Thus, they perceived no advantage of diverse crowds over 
homogeneous crowds. 
Imagined group estimates (H2). People’s guesses about different groups’ predictions 
are presented in Table IV.2. H2a was supported in that people typically overestimated the effect 
of social identity on judgment. In political judgments, for Ted Cruz, people thought 
conservatives would make higher performance predictions than liberals. For Hillary, people 
thought conservatives would make lower performance predictions than liberals. As for football 
score estimates, people thought Ohio State (OSU) fans would give higher estimates than 
Michigan (UM) fans when predicting OSU’s score. The reverse was true for predicting UM’s 
score. When guessing the mean estimates of men and women for attendance to the folk music 
performance, people thought women would give higher estimates of attendance than men. 
However, for the number of artists at the art fair, people did not think that estimates from 
different groups would differ, F(3, 54) = 1.43, p = .244. For all other studies, the r value was 
computed by treating people’s imagined mean estimates as if they were real, and thus r 
represents the point-biserial correlation between group membership and judgment.  
Table IV.2. People’s Estimates of Other People’s Predictions 
Estimate True 
Value 
 Mean  S.D. t df p d ri rt 
Cruz  13.1 Conservative 38.94  21.47 10.26 196 <.001 .99 .45*** .05 
 Liberal 20.88  14.15  
Hillary  56.5 Conservative 38.51  19.87 8.90 195 <.001 .94 .43*** .02 





Ohio State  42 OSU fans 39.21  13.43 18.65 198 <.001 1.63 .63*** .38** 
 UM fans 19.38  10.70  
Michigan  13 OSU fans 15.95  11.76 14.19 199 <.001 1.23 .52*** .34* 
 UM fans 32.09  14.42       
Music show  42 Women 46.7  23.10 5.59 61 <.001 .60 .29** .13 
  Men 33.32 21.10       
Art fair  351 Men 311.89 332.77 - - n.s. - - - 
  Women 288.05 395.45       
  Artists 285.14 314.47       
  Visitors 370.11 610.16       
Note: Means reflect what people thought, on average, other people estimated in each of the 
judgment tasks. For example, participants thought that conservatives predicted Cruz’s 
performance to be 38.95% of the vote. They thought that liberals predicted Cruz’s performance 
to be 14.15% of the vote. The ri column indicates the imaginary effect of social identity on 
judgment, while rt indicates the observed effect from previous studies. *, **, and *** indicate 
that r was significantly different from 0 at p < .05, p < .01, and p < .001 respectively. 
Hypothesis 2b was not consistently supported; sometimes mean estimates bracketed the 
true value and sometimes they did not. In Study 1a, for estimates of Cruz’ performance, the 
means (and medians) of imagined conservative and liberal predictions do not bracket the true 
value of 13.1. For estimates of Hillary’s performance, the means and medians barely bracket the 
true outcome of 56.5. For football scores, in neither case do the estimates of OSU fans and UM 
fans bracket the true outcome value. For Study 1b, however, people did imagine men and 
women’s estimates to bracket the criterion. In Study 1c only visitors overestimate the truth, all 
others underestimate. (Note that in Studies 1b and 1c, people were not given the true value.) 
Estimated accuracy gains. In Studies 1a and 1b, people reported by what percent 
diverse crowds would decrease error over homogeneous crowds (if they had indeed chosen 
diverse crowds as optimal). Those expectations are reported here. Additionally, homogeneous 
and diverse crowds of 8 were simulated from people’s imagined mean estimates of how each 
group would respond. One thousand crowds of each type were created. The accuracy of these 
simulated diverse (vs. homogeneous) crowds will reveal whether people’s estimated accuracy 
gains are reasonably derived from their imaginary estimates, or whether they are overblown. To 





people’s assumptions were true, then would their inferences about diverse crowd performance be 
accurate?” 
For Study 1a’s sports questions, people who chose diverse crowds thought that they 
would decrease error over homogeneous ones by 55% on average (S.D. = 21.05). The simulated 
crowd accuracy based on their imagined mean estimates was as follows: MAEHOMOG = 13.57
2 and 
MAEDIV = 12.56 for OSU’s points, and MAEHOMOG = 11.39 and MAEDIV = 11.12 for UM’s points. 
Therefore, if people’s assumptions were true, diverse crowds would have lower error than 
homogeneous crowds. But, the amount of error reduction would be negligible because people did 
not imagine much bracketing. In short, an inference problem is also present: people 
overestimated how much accuracy diversity would buy them even if their beliefs about bias had 
been correct.  
For Study 1a’s political questions, people who chose diverse crowds thought that they 
would decrease error over homogeneous ones by 57% on average (S.D. = 19.22). The crowd 
accuracy based on their imagined mean estimates was as follows: MAEHOMOG = 16.78 and 
MAEDIV = 16.64 for Cruz’s performance, and MAEHOMOG = 11.71 and MAEDIV = 9.82 for 
Hillary’s performance. People again overestimated by what margin diverse groups would 
decrease error – for Hillary’s performance, diverse crowds would have offered a 16% decrease in 
error, not 57%.  
For the concert attendance task in Study 1b, people who chose diverse crowds thought 
that they would decrease error over homogeneous ones by 43% on average (S.D. = 23.15). 
Simulations revealed that MAEHOMOG = 8.32, and MAEDIV = 6.17, a decrease of about 25%. Here, 
                                                 





people overestimated the degree of diversity benefits, but to a lesser extent because their 
imagined estimates bracketed the truth more evenly than imagined estimates in the other tasks. 
Discussion 
For three out of four judgment tasks, people expected diverse crowds to be more accurate 
than homogeneous crowds (H1). For those same studies people overestimated how much group 
membership predicts judgment (H2a). They also expected bracketing in some, but not all, cases 
(H2b). But when people did not expect group membership to influence judgment (Study 1c), 
they did not expect diverse crowds to be wiser than homogeneous ones.  
Thus, people only seem to expect social diversity benefits when they think the conditions 
for those benefits have been met to some degree. When they think people are biased, they expect 
diversity to trump homogeneity. When they think that people are not biased in a particular 
domain, they do not expect diverse crowds to be wiser than homogeneous ones.  
It is notable that people largely overestimated the differences between social groups’ 
estimates. Some simulations tested for diversity advantages assuming that people’s imagined 
beliefs were in fact true. Diverse crowds did consistently outperform homogeneous ones, but not 
nearly to the degree that people expected them to. Thus, although false beliefs about diversity 
seem to stem from wrong premises about bias, there is an inference error of degree as well. 
There are some limitations to this series of studies. First, there was some inconsistency in 
the bracketing results. Overall, people’s estimates for two social groups did not always bracket 
the true answer, even when they were given the true answer before providing their estimates. 
Another weakness is that I did not measure the dispersion that people may have imagined for 





conservative and liberal guesses. However, in another study not reported here I collected 
measures of dispersion and found that people both overestimate the difference between groups’ 
estimates and underestimate the variance within groups’ estimates. Finally, people in Study 1c 
gave error estimates for each crowd instead of choosing the wisest crowd like in Studies 1a and 
1b. This different response modality could have influenced the results. Study IV.2 more 
rigorously tested whether people expect diversity benefits only when the bias and bracketing 
conditions are met.  
Study IV.2 
 This study experimentally manipulated effect size and bracketing to test the effects of 
these conditions on people’s judgments about diverse crowd accuracy. In the study, people read 
hypothetical estimates from two different groups for a variety of judgment tasks. They also saw 
the true outcome, and then indicated whether sampling from only one of those groups 
(homogeneous) or both of those groups (diverse) was most likely to yield the most accurate 
prediction. It was hypothesized that when (1) groups were biased, with a visible effect of 
demographic membership on judgment, and (2) when estimate distributions bracketed the truth, 
people would be more likely to think diverse groups outperform homogeneous groups than when 
those conditions were not met. 
Method 
 One hundred and fifteen participants from the introductory psychology subject pool 
participated for course credit. The mean age was 18.53, S.D. = 1. Forty three percent were men, 
and the ethnic composition was: 7% Black, 14% Asian, 5% Latino(a), 5% Mixed or Other, 9% 
Other Asian or Pacific Islander, 60% White, non-Hispanic). Forty nine percent of participants 





Students participated in study sessions in groups of up to 5 people. At the start of each 
session, the experimenter gave a brief lesson on how to interpret histograms. The lesson was 
provided to make sure that everyone would be able to understand the questions in the study, but 
it provided no information on wisdom of crowds or judgment aggregation. The lesson 
PowerPoint slides included example histograms and the experimenter explained what the axes 
represented in each example. Participants identified the most frequent values across some 
example histograms, and they also interpreted an example with two distributions on the same 
plot. Finally, they were given a preview of the types of questions they would answer in the 
survey. Participants then proceeded to answer the survey questions on paper. 
The task contained 12 scenarios and questions like the one below. In the example, the 
team people cheer for clearly biases their estimates, and their estimate averages bracket the truth: 
Last year, Alabama played LSU. Alabama won with a total of 30 points. A random 
sample of students from Alabama and LSU were polled before the game. They guessed 
how many points Alabama would score. 
 
On average, Alabama students predicted that Alabama would get 33 points while LSU 
predicted 27 points. The graph shows the distributions of each group’s guesses. 
 
 Participants then saw a corresponding image that illustrated the distributions of each 
group’s guesses (see 4 examples in Figure IV.2). They then were told: “Imagine you will poll 10 
people and average their guesses together. If you want to be as accurate as possible, which 
approach would you take below? (clearly circle one)” and were given four options corresponding 
to the question. For the example question above, they would see these options:  
(a) Sample of only Alabama students 
(b) Sample of only LSU students 
(c) Mixed sample of Alabama and LSU students 






Figure IV.2. Bias by Bracketing (2 X 2) Design 
 
Note. In clock-wise order, they represent (a) bias, no bracketing, (b) no bias, bracketing, (c) no 
bias, no bracketing, and (d) bias and bracketing. Diverse crowds are optimal for (d) only. 
Across 12 questions in a within-subjects 2 X 2 design, the presence (absence) of 
judgment bias was manipulated, as was the presence (absence) of bracketing. There were three 
questions of each type. To manipulate bias, participants scenarios in which estimates from the 
two groups were different, on average (bias condition) or the same, on average (no bias 
condition). To manipulate bracketing, the true value lay approximately at the midpoint of all 
estimates (bracketing condition) or it lay offset from the midpoint (no bracketing condition). 
Figure IV.2 shows the visual representation of each cell in the design. 
Three domains were used in this study: sports, politics, and entertainment. Four questions 
were created for each domain. Within a domain, there was one question for each cell of the 2 X 2 







bracketing, 1 question with bias and without bracketing, and 1 question without either bias or 
bracketing. Diverse crowds should only be chosen as the most accurate for the first type of 
question (with bias and bracketing).  
Four versions of the survey were created using a Latin square approach to ensure that 
across all versions, each specific question was evenly paired with each variation of the 
manipulation. In each version, sports questions were presented first, followed by political 
questions and then by entertainment questions. Four more versions were then created to present 
the domains in an alternate order: politics, sports, and entertainment.  
Surveys were randomly distributed to participants in each session. After answering the 
questions, participants indicated their age, sex, and ethnicity. They also indicated whether they 
had previously taken a statistics course (yes or no). 
Results 
 The main question was whether participants were more likely to choose the diverse 
crowd as optimal when both necessary conditions were met as opposed to when they were not. 
Thus for each question, participants’ responses were coded as choosing the diverse option (1) or 
choosing another option (0). A logistic regression examined the effects of bracketing (present vs. 
absent), bias (present vs. absent), and domain on participants’ choices. Importantly, the 
interaction of effect size and bias was tested. The model allowed random intercepts for 
participants due to repeated measurements. The model failed to converge using all of these 
parameters, so a separate regression was conducted for each domain. 
 Across domains, most participants correctly chose the diverse crowd as optimal when 





number of participants choosing diverse crowds was reduced to about chance level (25%). Figure 
IV.3 shows the proportion of participants choosing diverse crowds for each question type across 
the 3 domains. In the 3 regressions, there was never a main effect of bracketing. Only for 
entertainment was there a main effect of bias (OR = 2.35, Z = 2, p = .045) such that people were 
about twice as like to choose diverse groups (vs. non diverse groups) when there was bias than 
when there was not. More importantly, the interaction was significant for all three domains, 
indicating that choosing a diverse crowd depended on both bracketing and bias (Political: OR = 
41.55, estimate = 3.73, Z = 6.63, p < .001; Sports: OR = 67.74, estimate = 4.22, Z = 6.31, p < 
.001; Entertainment: OR = 90.34, estimate = 4.51, Z = 5.91, p < .001).  
Figure IV.3. Effect of Bias and Bracketing on Diverse Choice 
 
Note. For the 4 conditions in this study (x-axis), participants were most likely to choose the 
diverse crowd as optimal in the “Bracket Bias” condition as opposed to the other 3. This reflects 













































differentially biased in their thinking and the truth lies near the center of people’s estimate 
distributions. 
 To break down the interaction, variables were coded in the following manner: questions 
for which both conditions were met were coded as 1, and each of the 3 remaining questions were 
coded as -1/3. This allowed me to contrast the question for which diverse crowds were optimal 
against all other questions for which diverse crowds were not optimal.  
In the political logistic regression, meeting both conditions meant the odds of choosing 
(vs. not choosing) diverse crowds was about 14 times greater than for questions in which both 
conditions were not met (OR = 13.77, estimate = 2.62, Z = 8.87, p < .001). For the sports logistic 
regression, meeting both conditions meant the odds of choosing (vs. not choosing) diverse 
crowds was about 37 times greater than when both condition were not met (OR = 37.21, estimate 
= 3.62, Z = 9.05, p < .001). When both conditions were met in the entertainment domain, the 
odds of choosing (vs. not choosing) diverse crowds was 47 times greater than when both 
conditions were not met (OR = 47.34, estimate = 3.86, Z = 8.34, p < .001). 
 Several measures of accuracy were also analyzed, including proportion correct, 
sensitivity, specificity, and ΔP (all measures described in Yates, 1990). Proportion correct 
indicates how often people were correct in identifying cases where diverse crowds were (or were 
not) optimal crowds 3. The mean proportion correct was .78 (S.D. = .23), suggesting that 
participants on average were correct in their judgments almost 80% of the time.  
The sensitivity and specificity of people’s judgments were also examined. Sensitivity 
indexes to what extent a target is indeed present when people say that it is. High values indicate 
                                                 
3 People’s true positives and true negatives were summed and divided by 12, the total number of judgments. “True 
positives” refer to instances where participants correctly said diverse crowds were best. “True negatives” refer to 





the person’s answers largely included true positives, while low values indicate that a person’s 
answers largely include false positives. Specificity indexes to what extent people are correct 
when they say a target is absent. High values indicate the person’s answers largely included true 
negatives, while low values indicate many false negatives (that is, people missed the presence of 
the target). 
Sensitivity is computed as a participant’s true positives divided by the total number of 
positives that s/he indicated. Mean sensitivity was .65 (S.D. = .19), so for every three times 
people said diversity was optimal, it was truly optimal for 2. Specificity is computed as a 
participant’s true negatives divided by the total number of negatives that s/he indicated. Mean 
specificity was .76 (S.D. = .31), so for every four times people said diversity was not optimal, it 
was truly not optimal for about 3. 
Finally, ΔP was computed for each participant. This is a contingency statistic reflecting 
the association between people’s judgments and the truth. It is computed by subtracting the false 
positive rate from the true positive rate (Yates, 1990). Scores of 1 and -1 indicate a perfect 
relationship between judgments and the truth, and 0 indicates no relationship between judgments 
and the truth. The average ΔP value was .40 (S.D. = .35), and it was significantly different from 
0, t(114) = 12.38, p < .001. The positive sign reflects that people’s judgments positively covaried 
with the truth; people were relatively likely to say diverse crowds were optimal when they were 
truly optimal, and relatively unlikely to say diverse crowds were optimal when they were not 
truly optimal. Whether a participant had taken a statistics course before or not had no association 






 When bias and bracketing are experimentally manipulated, people’s judgments about 
diversity advantages are sensitive to both. They were far more likely to say that diverse crowds 
were optimal when both bracketing and bias were present than when one or both were missing. 
The pattern held across three domains.  
These results suggest that when people expect diversity advantages, it is because they are 
assuming some degree of bias and some degree of bracketing. When those factors are 
manipulated, people are reasonably accurate in determining when to expect diverse crowds to be 
optimal. They are not perfect, however; they show some degree of Type I and Type II error. As 
Figure IV.3 shows, when the necessary conditions are not met about 25% of people still choose 
diverse crowds as optimal, and when both conditions are met, fewer than 100% of people choose 
diverse crowds.   
Study IV.3 
 Study IV.3 tests whether people prefer advice from a diverse crowd over advice from a 
homogeneous crowd. Although people in Study 1 reported thinking that diverse crowds are wiser 
than homogeneous ones, this does not necessarily translate into behavior. It is possible that 
people do not place much value on the perceived accuracy gains that diverse crowds offer, or it is 
possible that people prefer advice from homogeneous groups. In information seeking tasks, 
people often prefer information that is consistent with their own views and biases (Hart et al., 
2009), so this may lead people to prefer information from homogeneous crowds comprised of 
similar others. Conversely, people may think that homogeneous crowds comprised of dis-similar 





behavioral measure, choice, was used to test H3: People will prefer to see advice from diverse 
crowds when making estimates in judgment tasks. 
 The study was structured to measure the preference for diversity conservatively. 
Specifically, people had the option to choose to see answers from three kinds of crowds: a 
diverse crowd of two people (1 liberal and 1 conservative) or a homogeneous crowd of three 
people (3 liberals or 3 conservatives). In other work, I have demonstrated that homogeneous 
crowds of 3 are often just as wise or wiser than diverse crowds of 2 (de Oliveira & Larrick, in 
preparation). Therefore, normatively speaking people should not show a preference for diverse 
crowds.  
Method 
People were approached in public spaces near a large university and invited to participate 
in a short advice preference study. One hundred and forty-six people participated (Mage = 20.72, 
S.D. = 4.83; 79 men, 64 women, 1 non-binary and 3 did not report sex). They were told they 
would answer some trivia questions on paper and could earn a $1 off coupon for a local coffee 
shop if their answers were accurate enough. They were also told that to help with the task, they 
should choose what type of advice would be useful to them. The advice consisted of answers 
from people who previously took the task. 
Participants chose between seeing answers from 1 conservative and 1 liberal, 3 
conservatives, or 3 liberals. Four versions of the survey rotated the order of diverse (vs. 
homogeneous) advice first, as well as whether conservatives or liberals were first. Participants 
received, in fact, about the same advice regardless of their choice options, only there were 2 or 3 





After making their selection and receiving a sheet of paper with the previous answers, 
participants guessed the answer to four questions: (1) “What percentage of votes did Hillary 
Clinton win in Maryland?” (2) “What percentage of votes did Donald Trump win in New 
Jersey?” (3) “What percentage of votes did Hillary Clinton win in Alabama?” and (4) “What 
percentage of votes did Donald Trump win in Utah?” They then indicated their age, sex, and 
political orientation. The experimenter checked the answers against a sheet with the correct 
answers to maintain the cover story, but everyone received the coupon for participating. 
Results 
 Six participants did not choose any advice. Participants who chose advice 
overwhelmingly preferred advice from a diverse group of two people (77%) rather than from a 
homogeneous group of 3, χ2 (1, N = 140) = 121.99, p < .001. Political orientation did not predict 
whether people chose (vs. did not choose) diverse advice. However, of those who chose 
homogeneous advice, their own political orientation strongly predicted the type of homogeneous 
crowd that they chose, r = -.59, N = 37, p < .001. The more liberal participants were, the less 
likely they were to choose conservative homogeneous crowds.  
Discussion 
 Using a paradigm in which people normatively should not prefer diverse advice if they 
are seeking the most accurate advice, I nevertheless found that most people choose diverse 
advice. This suggests that people are willing to act on their beliefs that diverse crowds are wiser. 
This also suggests that they place some measure of value on the accuracy gains that diverse 
crowds supposedly bring. However, all of the advice in this study was free, so these results do 
not reveal whether people are willing to invest more resources to obtain diverse advice as 






 In many conditions, obtaining information can cost resources including time, energy, and 
money. People tend to work with similar others (Feld, 1982), so obtaining a diverse crowd can 
cost more than obtaining a homogeneous one. Although people choose diverse crowds when they 
cost no more than homogeneous ones, are they willing to choose them when they cost more 
(H4)? Study 4 tests whether people are willing to pay more for diverse advice when engaging in 
a political judgment task. In the study, people earn $1 for correct answers and can pay different 
amounts of money for homogeneous and diverse advice. Participants also report their beliefs 
about the accuracy of diverse and homogeneous advice. 
Method 
Participants were recruited from an introductory psychology course. One hundred and 
five participants took the study for course credit. Their mean age was 18.95 (S.D. = 1.14), there 
were 53 men, 51 women, and 1 participant did not indicate sex. The group was 6% Black, 62% 
White, non-Hispanic, 5% East Asian, 6% Latino/a, 10% South Asian, Pacific Islander, or other 
Asian, 2% “Other”, and 10% mixed race. The group leaned liberal, MPOLIT = 3.52, S.D. = 1.47 (1 
= Very liberal, 7 = Very conservative).  
Each session included between 1 to 10 participants seated at individual computers. At the 
start of each session, participants learned that in a previous study I asked 200 American adults to 
guess what percentage of votes Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump would win in different states 
in the 2016 presidential election. Participants were told that they would likewise guess what 
percentage of votes the candidates received and that they could buy different types of advice 
drawn from that previous study. Each answer that fell within 1 percentage point of the correct 





of advice that they bought. Participants were quizzed on the instructions and proceeded to the 
task only when they answered all questions correctly. 
Twelve survey blocks asked participants to guess the percentage of votes a candidate 
received in a given state. Block order was randomized. Six questions asked about Trump, and 6 
asked about Clinton. Four states had leaned Democrat in the previous election, four had leaned 
Republican, and two (Ohio and Florida) were traditionally swing states. Four conditions varied 
which states were paired with which candidates and which type of advice. Across conditions, 
each state was paired evenly with each candidate, and each type of advice was paired with each 
state. 
 In each survey block, participants first read the question and the advice instructions. For 
example, “What percentage of votes did Donald Trump win in Alabama? For each of the advice 
pairs below, click on the one you would prefer to buy.” They then indicated their overall 
preference for a homogeneous group’s advice vs. a diverse group’s advice. There were 4 types of 
homogeneous advice, crossing sex and political orientation. For every question one type of 
homogeneous group (e.g., conservative women) was contrasted against a diverse group. For 
example, “Overall do you prefer to see the average guess from 6 liberal men or a group of 6 men 
and women, conservatives and liberals?”  
For each question participants completed two advice choice sets in random order. One 
advice set held the cost of homogeneous advice constant at 10 cents while diverse cost varied. 
The other advice set held the cost of diverse advice constant while homogeneous cost varied. For 
example, participants indicated their preference for each of these pairs:  
(a) liberal men, 10 cents or men, women, conservatives, liberals, 10 cents  





(c) liberal men, 10 cents or men, women, conservatives, liberals, 50 cents 
(d) liberal men, 10 cents or men, women, conservatives, liberals, 75 cents 
(e) liberal men, 10 cents or men, women, conservatives, liberals, 1 dollar  
Participants were told that one of their choices would be randomly presented on the next 
page. In fact, the same advice was presented to all subjects, with only the label varying according 
to one of their choices. Thus their perceptions of the effectiveness of advice type could only be 
derived from the label, not the advice itself. After seeing the advice, participants typed their 
guess into an open-ended text box. 
After completing the 12 blocks, participants indicated how useful they thought each type 
of advice would be for this type of task. First, they answered, “For the questions like the ones in 
this in this survey, which of the following group types do you think would offer the most 
accurate advice overall?” The choices were: “Men and women of all ages,” “Groups with 
specific demographics (like just liberal men, or just conservative women),” or “Both types of 
groups are equally accurate.” (The first item wording was a mistake; it should have read “Men 
and women, liberals and conservatives” but it nevertheless conveys more demographic diversity 
than the other option.) The next two questions asked about the frequency with which one type of 
advice was the best: “For questions like the ones in this survey, how often do you think a group 
of men and women, liberals and conservatives would offer the most accurate advice?” and a 
Likert response scale was used (1 = “Almost Never,” 2 = “About 25% of the time,” 3 = “About 
50% of the time,” 4 = “About 75% of the time,” and 5 = “Almost always.”) The same question 
was asked about specific, homogeneous groups. 
The third set of questions measured what accuracy gains or losses people expected for the 
average person who heeded diverse vs. homogeneous advice. The instructions read: “For the 





heeded advice from men, women, liberals and conservatives. How do you think this would affect 
Sam's performance compared to not using any advice?” The options were, “It would make Sam 
more accurate” (coded as 1), “It would make Sam less accurate” (coded as -1), and “It wouldn’t 
affect Sam’s accuracy” (coded as 0). A continuous slider scale anchored at 0 and 50 was then 
presented so that participants could indicate by how much Sam’s score would increase or 
decrease. Participants who said it wouldn’t be affected were told to indicate 0. In analyses, the 
answer on the slider scale was multiplied with the answer to the accuracy question to compute an 
index of accuracy change. 
Participants answered the same question for 2 homogeneous groups. For example, 
“Suppose Sam always chose & heeded advice from (liberal men/conservative women). How do 
you think this would affect Sam's performance compared to not using any advice?” The group 
presented for each question was shuffled such that a different group was presented for each 
question, and the two groups would not overlap on gender or political orientation. Groups were 
evenly presented across conditions. For analyses, answers from these two questions were 
averaged together. 
At the end of the survey, participants indicated their sex, age, political orientation, and 
ethnicity. They were paid for any questions they got correct (MPAYMENT = 1.19, S.D. = 1.08), and 
no deductions were taken from their bonus based on their advice choices. 
Results 
Overall advice preference. Participants strongly preferred advice from diverse sources. 
Before making their advice choices for each of the 12 questions, participants first indicated what 
type of advice they preferred overall. The proportion of times that participants chose diverse 





proportion was .83, and 32% percent of participants always chose the diverse crowd for this 
question. To analyze the highly skewed data, participants were simply binned into 2 groups – 
those who chose diverse crowds half of the time or less, and those who chose diverse over half of 
the time. The vast majority of participants (77%) chose diverse groups over half of the time, χ2 
(1, N = 105) = 30.94, p < .001. 
Equal cost advice. When the cost of homogeneous and diverse advice was equal, people 
chose diverse crowds most of the time. Recall that for each choice set, either diverse or 
homogeneous crowds were more expensive, and the other crowd cost was held at 10 cents. Each 
choice set began with the two crowds costing 10 cents each. The proportion of times that each 
participant chose the diverse group was computed across all questions. The distribution was 
again heavily negatively skewed. The median proportion was .75, and 23% of participants 
always chose the diverse advice for this question. Binning participants into those who chose the 
diverse group over 50% of the time and those who chose the diverse group 50% of the time or 
less revealed that 78% of participants chose the diverse crowd over half of the time, χ2 (1, N = 
105) = 33.15, p < .001.  
Maximum willingness to pay. For each of the 12 questions, I computed the maximum 
participants were willing to pay (WTP) for diverse advice when it cost more and I computed the 
maximum participants were willing to pay for homogeneous advice when it cost more. This 
maximum was averaged across all 12 questions separately for diverse advice and for 
homogeneous advice.  
The maximum WTP was not normally distributed. The median WTP for diverse advice 
when it cost more was 38.33 cents. The median WTP for homogeneous advice when it cost more 





diverse advice but only 3.75 cents more on homogeneous advice. Figure IV.4 shows the 
distributions of maximum WTP for diverse vs. homogeneous advice with the WTP variable 
binned into 5 categories indicating the maximum amount people were willing to pay for the more 
expensive advice. For homogeneous advice questions, most people were willing to pay between 
10 to 25 cents. People were willing to pay about twice as much for diverse advice: between 25 
and 50 cents. 
Figure IV.4. Distribution of Maximum WTP by Advice Type, Study IV.4 
 
Note. The y-axis indicates the number of participants. The red bars show the distribution of 
maximum WTP when diverse advice was more expensive, and the blue bars show the 
distribution when homogeneous advice was more expensive. People had a higher maximum 
WTP when the crowd was presented as diverse than when it was presented as homogeneous. 
A Wilcoxon signed rank test was performed on WTP for diverse vs. homogeneous 
advice. For each participant, WTPDIV was compared against their average WTPHOM. The 




















Beliefs about advice. Most participants (50%) thought that for the questions in this 
survey, diverse crowds would provide the best advice overall. Twenty nine percent thought 
crowds from a specific demographic group would provide the best advice overall, and 20% 
thought both types of crowds would be equally accurate. Response proportions significantly 
differed, χ2 (1, N = 105) = 15.57, p < .001. In response to how often each crowd type would be 
the most accurate, people thought diverse crowds would be the most accurate crowd 60% of the 
time versus 31% of the time for homogeneous groups. (On the 5-point response scale, MDIV = 
3.38, S.D. = 1.13, and MHOM = 2.24, S.D. = .89). The difference was significant, t(103) = 6.97, p 
< .001.  
People thought heeding diverse advice would improve accuracy while heeding 
homogeneous advice would harm accuracy. Specifically, when people considered a hypothetical 
participant, Sam, who heeded diverse advice, they expected Sam’s performance to improve by 
10.87 points on average (S.D. = 18.12). This improvement was significantly different from 0, 
t(103) = 6.12, p < .001. When Sam heeded homogeneous advice, people expected Sam’s 
performance to worsen by 7.06 points on average (S.D. = 19.37), and this significantly differed 
from 0, t(103) = 3.72, p < .001.  
Discussion 
 Participants were more willing to pay for diverse advice than for homogeneous advice. 
This difference was consistent with their beliefs that diverse crowds improved performance more 
often and to a greater degree than homogeneous crowds. In fact, they believed that homogeneous 
crowds would harm performance. These beliefs are inconsistent with the conclusions from 






 Study IV.5 tests the same question as Study IV.4 using a similar paradigm, but in a far 
less adversarial domain. Instead of political judgments, people in Study IV.5 guessed the 
popularity of different books. Before making their guess for each book, they indicated their 
preference for advice from diverse versus homogeneous crowds. 
Method 
Participants were recruited on MTurk to complete a survey on trivia questions. They were 
told about our previous study in which I asked 50 MTurk participants to rate their interest level 
for various books. For this study, they guessed the average rating of those 50 participants. Before 
making each guess, they were presented with several pairs of advice options, and for each pair 
they indicated which advice type they preferred. Advice varied in cost and whether it was drawn 
from a homogeneous or diverse crowd. Participants were given a $1 bonus for every answer 
within .2 points of the correct answer.  
Books. Participants guessed the average interest for 8 novels which had been pre-tested 
as gender neutral in their appeal. The books were: Beyond Black, by Hillary Mantel; City of 
Bones, by Cassandra Clare; Freedom, by Jonathan Franzen; Harry Potter and the Sorcerer's 
Stone, by J. K. Rowling; Shalimar the Clown, by Salman Rushdie; The Great Gatsby, by F. Scott 
Fitzgerald; To Kill a Mockingbird, by Harper Lee; Knife of Dreams, by Robert Jordan. The 
books were taken from a larger list compiled from various online recommendation lists. They 
varied in genre as well as publication date, containing both “classics” and modern novels. They 
also varied in popular appeal, as based on the pre-test. 
Advice. Participants were told that their advice was derived from a dataset of 





randomly chosen people’s guesses were averaged together to create each piece of advice, and 
unbeknownst to them all participants were given the same advice regardless of what option they 
chose. For each book set, participants were presented with pairs of advice options. They could 
choose between 1 homogeneous crowd’s advice or 1 diverse crowd’s advice. Four homogeneous 
crowds were used in this study, crossing age and sex. For a given book, participants could be 
offered advice from younger women, older women, younger men, or older men. (Four between-
subjects versions of the survey were created using a modified latin square design such that across 
all conditions, each book was evenly paired with each type of homogeneous advice.) Diverse 
advice was labeled as coming from a group of men and women of all ages. 
Procedure. In each survey block, participants first saw the book title, author, and cover 
image. They then indicated advice preference before receiving advice and making their final 
guess. For a given book, one type of homogeneous advice was paired with diverse advice across 
a series of pairs that varied the prices. Participants indicated their preference for each pair. 
One set contained pairs in which homogeneous advice cost was held at 1 cent while 
diverse advice cost varied from 4 to 16 cents in increments of 4. The other set contained pairs in 
which diverse advice cost was held at 1 cent while homogeneous advice cost varied from 4 to 16 
cents in increments of 44. All participants answered both sets of questions for each book, 
presented in random order. Then, they indicated which advice type they would prefer if both 
types were equally expensive, at 4 cents. The prices were derived from pre-testing and a previous 
                                                 
4 For example, participants read, “Choose the option in each row that you would prefer, given the advice type and 
cost” and then could make a choice for each of the following pairs: (a) younger women, 1 cent or men and women 
of all ages, 4 cents, (b) younger women, 1 cent or men and women of all ages, 8 cents, (c) younger women, 1 cent or 
men and women of all ages, 12 cents, and (d) younger women, 1 cent or men and women of all ages, 16 cents. 





study on MTurk in which participants indicated the maximum they would hypothetically be 
willing to pay for such advice. 
After indicating their preferences, participants proceeded to the next page to receive the 
advice, which they were told was randomly chosen from their preference answers. In fact, they 
were always given advice coming from whichever group they chose when the price was equal. 
The advice value was always the same across participants, only the label changed. Participants 
then gave their answer and proceeded to the next book. 
In the final section of the survey, participants indicated how useful they thought 
homogeneous and diverse advice was for this type of task. The questions were the same as in 
Study IV.4. They first chose which type of advice would be best overall for this task: (a) advice 
from men and women of all ages, (b) advice from a specific group, or (c) both types of advice 
would be equally accurate. They then indicated how often they thought diverse (homogeneous) 
advice would be the most accurate type of advice on a Likert scale (1 = almost never, 2 = about 
25% of the time, 3 = about 50% of the time, 4 = about 75% of the time, 5 = almost always). 
 Finally, they indicated how different kinds of advice might impact accuracy on the task. 
The instructions read: “For the questions below, imagine an average participant named ‘Sam’. 
Suppose Sam always chose and heeded advice from men and women of all ages. How do you 
think this would affect Sam's performance compared to not using any advice?” The options were, 
“It would make Sam more accurate” (coded as 1), “It would make Sam less accurate” (coded as -
1), and “It wouldn’t affect Sam’s accuracy” (coded as 0). A continuous slider scale anchored at 0 
and 50 was then presented so that participants could indicate by how much Sam’s score would 





analyses, the answer on the slider scale was multiplied with the answer to the accuracy question 
to compute an index of accuracy change. 
Participants answered the same question for 2 homogeneous groups. For example, 
“Suppose Sam always chose & heeded advice from (older men/younger women). How do you 
think this would affect Sam's performance compared to not using any advice?” The group 
presented for each question was shuffled such that a different group was presented for each 
question, and the two groups would not overlap on gender or age. Groups were evenly presented 
across conditions. For analyses, answers from these two questions were averaged together. 
Results 
Data collection stopped at 200 participants, which was the intended sample size. 
However, 25 participants were not directed to the book task but instead immediately proceeded 
to the final set of questions due to an error in the survey programming. Those participants’ 
responses were not analyzed and more participants were run to compensate for the error, thus the 
final sample size included 201 participants who completed the full survey.  
Equal cost advice. When the cost for diverse and homogeneous advice was the same, 
across the 8 books the average proportion of times people chose diverse advice was .75 (S.D. = 
.23). The data were heavily negatively skewed. Therefore, the data were dichotomized into two 
groups for a simple comparison: participants who chose diverse crowds half of the time or less, 
and participants who chose diverse crowds over half of the time. The vast majority (78%) chose 
diverse crowds over half of the time, χ2 (1, N = 201) = 63.53, p < .001. 
Maximum willingness to pay. To analyze WTP, I again computed two variables for 





diverse was more expensive and (2) the maximum WTP when homogeneous advice was more 
expensive. The data were strongly positively skewed for homogeneous advice and diverse advice 
data resembled a uniform distribution. The median WTP for diverse advice was 7.38 cents (S.D. 
= 4.91), and for homogeneous advice it was 2.25 cents (S.D. = 3.48). Figure VI.5 shows the 
distribution of WTP for diverse and homogeneous advice. 
Figure IV.5. Distribution of Maximum WTP by Advice Type, Study IV.5 
 
Note. The y-axis indicates the number of participants. The red bars show the distribution of 
maximum WTP when diverse advice was more expensive, and the blue bars show the 
distribution when homogeneous advice was more expensive. People had a higher maximum 
WTP when the crowd was presented as diverse than when it was presented as homogeneous. 
A Wilcoxon signed rank test was performed on the data because they violated normality 
assumptions. Participants were willing to pay significantly more for diverse advice than 
homogeneous advice, Z = 9.39, p < .001, r = .73. As can be seen in Figure IV.5, when 
homogeneous advice was more expensive, most participants did not want to pay more for it. The 
leftmost bin on the x-axis, “1”, shows the number of people who always preferred to pay 1 cent 



















diverse advice was more expensive, most participants were willing to pay up to at least 8 cents 
for it. 
 Beliefs about advice. Most participants (66%) thought that overall, diverse advice was 
the most accurate. Twenty one percent thought homogeneous advice from a particular group 
would be the most accurate, and only 13% thought that advice from either group type would be 
equally accurate, χ2 (1, N = 201) = 96.27, p < .001. When indicating how often they thought each 
type of advice would be the most accurate, participants thought that diverse advice would be the 
most accurate about 64% of the time (M = 3.57, S.D. = .90, on the 5-point scale) whereas 
homogeneous advice would be the most accurate only 36% of the time (M = 2.44, S.D. = .95). 
The difference was significantly different, t(399.09) = 12.23, p < .001. 
 People thought that the two types of advice would have significantly different effects on 
performance – that heeding homogeneous advice would hurt the average person’s performance, 
but that heeding diverse advice would improve it. Specifically, participants thought that heeding 
homogeneous advice would lower Sam’s accuracy by 1.46 points (S.D. = 3.22), and this decrease 
was significantly greater than 0, t(200) = 6.42, p < .001. They thought that heeding diverse 
advice would improve Sam’s accuracy by 2.92 points (S.D. = 3.85), and this was significantly 
greater than 0, t(200) = 10.77, p < .001. Thus the average difference between expected 
performance while heeding diverse (vs. homogeneous) advice was 4.38 points, S.D. = 5.33. 
Discussion 
In a different domain with a different sample, this study again found that people act on 
their beliefs about the superiority of diverse crowds. People thought diverse crowds would be 
optimal more often than homogeneous crowds, and that heeding diverse advice boosts 














As the model in Chapter II indicates, in order for socially diverse groups to form wiser 
crowds than homogeneous groups, the groups must be substantially different in the estimates that 
they provide and the truth must lie close to the midpoint between the means of the two 
distributions. Across various judgment tasks, I found that these conditions are rarely met. They 
proved, in fact, to be very difficult to engineer (Chapter III). People of different social 
backgrounds generally made similar judgments, and the judgment distributions of different 
groups rarely bracketed the truth neatly. In other words, the diversity (variance) within social 
groups was relatively big and the diversity (variance) between social groups was relatively small. 
Homogeneous groups were often as diverse in their estimates as demographically diverse 
crowds, producing equally wise crowds.  
Chapter IV showed that people expect diverse crowds to be wiser than homogeneous 
ones. Their assumptions about bias seem to be wrong in that they overestimate the effect of 
social diversity on judgment. When these assumptions are corrected for (Study IV.2), people’s 
inferences lead them to more accurate conclusions. Chapter IV studies also showed that people 
act on their beliefs about optimal crowds. When using diverse crowds does not cost more, people 
prefer socially diverse crowds to homogeneous ones (Studies IV.3 – IV.5). When diverse crowds 
cost more, people were willing to pay about three times as much for diverse advice than for 





were incorrect, and they consequently invested extra resources on an advice set that did not offer 
them more accuracy than the alternative. 
Importantly, people in Studies IV.4 and IV.5 thought that always heeding diverse advice 
would decrease accuracy. This belief is unsupported by the data in Chapter III. In the original 
book rating task described in Chapter III, the average individual absolute error was 2.24. 
Simulated crowd error for homogeneous and diverse crowds were both 1.12. Therefore both 
types of advice halve error. For the national presidential election task, individual error was 14.52 
on average. Diverse crowd error was 9.09 and homogeneous crowd error was 8.89. Again, both 
types of crowds improve accuracy to about the same degree. Thus, participants in the payment 
studies underestimated the benefit of homogeneous crowds. One might say that they did not 
overpay for a diverse crowd, but that they underpaid for a homogeneous one. 
 What do these findings this say about efforts to increase workplace diversity based on 
arguments that it is beneficial for performance? The efficacy of such initiatives depends, as I 
note in the introduction, on the task, what is meant by diversity, and what is meant by 
performance. For some tasks, demographic diversity can help individual thinking (e.g., Sommers 
et al., 2008). For our particular task (numerical judgment), and our definitions of performance 
(accuracy) and diversity (social factors), diversity was not found to be beneficial because the 
theoretical conditions for its benefits were not met with real data. Thus practitioners must not 
generalize from the present work to all organizational contexts. They should instead consult 
empirical work that examines tasks and groups that are analogous to their organization’s.  
It is also important to note that across all of our tasks and models, social diversity does 
not hurt crowd performance. It was observed to simply have no benefit relative to homogeneous 





in Chapter III, people may still prefer diverse crowds over homogeneous ones as a risk reduction 
strategy. In those presumably rare conditions under which homogeneous groups produce very 
different estimates, diversity reduces risk by ensuring a moderate performance. People rarely 
know a priori which type of group will be the most accurate (if they do, they of course should 
poll that group). Thus choosing a homogeneous group carries some risk – it might produce the 
best crowd, but it just as easily could produce the worst. By contrast, in no simulation or 
experimental study was the diverse crowd the worst performing one – it was consistently 
moderate. 
Does this work contradict evidence that demographic diversity is beneficial for group 
performance? As noted in the introduction, social diversity has been found to have measurable 
benefits in other tasks that are different from those used in the present work. Note, however, that 
in many of those circumstances, social diversity did not improve performance due to the 
mechanisms tested here. That is, socially diverse people were not bringing diverse pieces of 
information to the table. Instead, diversity seemed to motivate the individuals involved to think 
more critically than they would have in a homogeneous setting. In other studies diversity seemed 
to lead people to be more open to different perspectives (Phillips et al., 2004). These individual 
cognitive factors, in turn, could improve group performance.  
One limitation of the present work is that none of our tasks involved repeated judgments 
of the exact same phenomenon. Events typically have variance in their realizations – to take the 
football example, teams’ scores vary each year. Thus, to obtain the most rigorous test of the 
bracketing assumption, I would ideally test predictions of the same game over many years. (I 
mitigated this problem slightly by using multiple measures in the same domain.) Nevertheless, 





groups in question would still need to be making very different estimates in order for diversity to 
yield an accuracy benefit. Our many measures suggest that this necessary condition would not 
frequently be met, and its co-occurrence with the bracketing condition would be even less 
frequent. I am therefore skeptical that a substantial social diversity advantage would emerge over 
repeated judgments of the same event, but future empirical work is needed to test that 
proposition. 
Another limitation of the present work is that the conclusions rest, in part, on null results, 
although the more general “wisdom of crowds” effect was consistently observed and there were 
various significant relationships between social identity and judgment. This does not mean that 
socially diverse crowds cannot be wiser than socially homogeneous crowds, but I would argue 
that it is quite difficult to observe and to intentionally create this phenomenon. One may find 
large differences in judgment if comparing data from rural Vietnam with data collected in 
downtown Chicago. However, that does not seem to be the magnitude of diversity sought and 
achieved in many organizations.  
Related to the previous point, the findings of null or small effect sizes seem to contradict 
previous work linking social factors with judgment. People of different cultures think differently 
(Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Oyserman & Lee, 2008; Savani, Cho, Baik, & 
Morris, 2015, Yates & de Oliveira, 2016), as do people of different political orientations 
(Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Talhelm et al., 2015). Other ecological factors like disease 
burden, history of frontier migration, or mode of subsistence have all been linked to social norms 
that affect thinking, whether directly or indirectly (Gelfand et al., 2011; Talhelm et al., 2014; 





The present findings do not contradict that research. Work finding social differences on 
judgment has often focused on attitudes or general cognitive style, but the present work focuses 
specifically on numerical judgments of fact. This is a crucial distinction, as many biases have 
been shown to be reduced when people are more accountable for their judgments or decisions 
(e.g., Krizan & Windschitl, 2007; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). As proposed earlier in this paper, 
requiring a numerical judgment is a form of higher accountability because the accuracy of the 
judgment can be verified against a standard. One might therefore expect that most studies of 
cognition across social groups would find smaller differences for precise judgments about 
matters of fact than for reports about attitudes, preferences, or “softer” judgment tasks. 
Future work may build upon the present findings in several ways. First, the implications 
of these findings for intergroup dynamics should be explored. How would people respond to the 
observation that for some tasks, different and even “polar opposite” groups like liberals and 
conservatives think more similarly than expected? Correcting for people’s over-estimation of 
differences may promote intergroup harmony and willingness to work with outgroup members. 
On the other hand, people may take that observation to mean that input from outgroup members 
is redundant and unnecessary. They may then in turn justify distancing themselves from those 
people.  
Second, the question remains as to whether one can produce the necessary conditions for 
diversity benefits with intervention or direct manipulation. Processes that amplify biases are 
good candidates to test. For example, group deliberation about contentious topics in an attitude-
diverse group can shift people’s beliefs in more polarized directions (Wojcieszak, 2011). 
Consequently, judgments about matters of fact might become more biased after people deliberate 





homogenize estimates within a social group and diversify estimates between social groups, 
producing one of the conditions necessary for social diversity to outperform homogeneity. It is 
unclear, however, whether such an intervention would be worthwhile. As individuals become 
more biased, some or all homogeneous groups may consistently move away from good 
judgment, even as diverse crowds remain fairly accurate due to bias cancellation. In other words, 
it is possible that polarization would simply make homogeneous crowds worse while leaving 
diverse crowds unaffected, thereby increasing the discrepancy between those crowd types 
without necessarily making diverse crowds more accurate.5  
In conclusion, these findings suggest that while estimate diversity and bias cancellation 
make crowds wiser than individuals, social diversity does not amplify this wisdom of crowds 
effect. Thus, social diversity should not be used as a proxy for cognitive diversity in judgment 
tasks where people are providing concrete judgments independently. In this type of task, when 
sorted by commonly used social factors like age, sex, and ethnicity, people are more alike than 
different.  
  
                                                 
5 For an illustration, see Figure II.1. At r = .1, assuming the truth is near the middle, participants from both groups 
are on average fairly accurate. Diverse and homogeneous crowds do well, as do individuals to some degree. At r = 
.8, by necessity, as groups move away from each other they also move farther away from the truth, again assuming it 
is close to the middle. Thus, diverse crowds become wiser than homogeneous ones, and individuals fare worse as 







Chapter III Studies: Methods Details 
Study 1 
Participants were recruited on MTurk to participate in a trivia and prediction task. For 
this study, I targeted users who reported living in Michigan or Ohio, and analyzed data from 
participants indicating they cheered either for Ohio State or the University of Michigan’s football 
team (N = 51). Respondents were told that the most accurate participant would get a bonus of $5 
credited to their MTurk account. They guessed how many points football teams would score in 
an upcoming game in the 2015 season. The teams and games were presented in random order 
and included Florida State, University of Florida, University of Connecticut, Temple University, 
University of Maryland, Rutgers University, University of Wisconsin, University of Minnesota, 
Northwestern University, University of Illinois, UCLA, University of Southern California, Texas 
A & M, Louisiana State University, Ohio State University, University of Michigan. Analyses 
focused on Ohio State and Michigan predictions. 
Study 2 
Participants estimated the percentage of votes that Republican and Democratic candidates 
would receive in two upcoming primaries preceding the 2016 presidential election: New 
Hampshire and Ohio. The most accurate performers (top 10%) were entered into a raffle to win 





O’Malley, Donald Trump, Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, John Kasich, and Jeb Bush. They also 
indicated how often they read the news. The order in which participants completed the task – 
demographics or estimation first – was randomized across subjects. The order did not appear to 
have any systematic effects and it is not discussed further. 
Participants also indicated how often they used each of several strategies on a 5-point 
scale (1 = Never, 5 = Always): Random guessing, web searches, asking another person, 
reasoning about the question, and going with their gut. People’s dominant strategies included 
going with their gut (M = 3.43, S.D. = 1.11) and reasoning about the question (M = 3.23, S.D. = 
1.23). Next, people on average favored random guessing (M = 2.34, S.D. = 1.23) and reported 
little use of web searches (M = 1.37, S.D. = .91) and asking others (M = 1.18, S.D. = .63).  
Study 3 
Participants estimated the percentage of Americans that support a variety of polarizing 
political views. The most accurate participants (top 10%) were entered into a raffle to win $5. 
They answered six questions: What percentage of Americans (1) “… favor forming a federal 
database to track gun sales?” (2) “… are against the sale of assault-style weapons to the public?” 
(3) “… favor building a fence along the entire Mexican border?” (4) “… think the earth is getting 
warmer mostly because of human activity?” (5) “… favor more offshore oil and gas drilling in 
the U.S.?” and (6) “... think abortion should be legal in most or all cases?” Respondents typed 
their answers into an open-ended text box. They also indicated their own attitudes towards each 
topic; agreement was indicated on a 6-point scale (1 = Strongly Oppose/Disagree, 6 = Strongly 





winning the Iowa caucus preceding the 2016 election. Candidates were Donald Trump, Ted 
Cruz, Jeb Bush, Ben Carson, Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders, and Martin O’Malley.  
There were three conditions, with random assignment. All participants completed 
demographic items first. In one condition, participants reported their personal views before 
making their estimates for Americans in general. In the second condition, this order was 
reversed. In the third condition, participants gave their opinions before making estimates and 
were explicitly reminded of the political orientation that they had indicated. Further, I told them 
that their views were very important to our study as they might complement the estimates of 
others such that, when averaged, the group estimates could yield highly accurate results. 
Accuracy was the same across conditions (p = .734). No condition consistently produced 
stronger relationships between political identity and estimates. Thus the reported results are 
collapsed across conditions. 
To test for attention, two recall questions asked which items I had (or had not) covered in 
the survey. Eight percent of subjects failed both questions. They were filtered out, leaving 564 
participants. 
Study 4 
Participants predicted how the candidates would perform in the 2016 United States 
presidential election. They specifically predicted what percentage of votes Hillary Clinton and 
Donald Trump would each receive in 10 states in the upcoming 2016 United States presidential 
election. Four states each had previously favored the Republican (Alabama, Idaho, Utah, 
Wyoming) or Democratic (Maryland, New York, Vermont, New Jersey) candidate in the 2012 






Participants guessed the popularity rating of 24 books, previously tested among 50 
MTurk users. The 24 books were chosen from a larger set of books based on online lists of most 
popular books. I tested to what extent those books appealed to a particular gender or had gender-
neutral appeal. For the judgment task in Study 5, 12 of the pre-tested books had gendered appeal 
(e.g. “My Sister’s Keeper” is a feminine book), and 12 of the books were neutral (e.g., “Harry 
Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone”).  
 Fifty MTurkers viewed the title, author, and cover image of 24 books and answered the 
question, “My interest level in this book is…” by choosing an interest level on a scale of 0 to 10, 
with 1 decimal place. The books varied in how interesting they were to the participants, with 
average ratings ranging from 2.74 to 6.67. The average interest level in each book was used as 
the criterion against which the participants in the judgment study were assessed. The participants 
in the judgment study viewed the title, author, and cover image of the same 24 books and 
guessed the average interest level for each book on the same scale as the 50 raters. 
Study 6 
Participants estimated the likelihood of 40 events occurring between the time they took 
the study (“now”) and May 1, 2016. Questions covered diverse topics such as economics, 
politics, movies, sports, and social issues, and were derived from current BBC news stories with 
inspiration from the Good Judgment Project (Mellers et al., 2014). About half pertained to events 
in the United States and half pertained to international events. The questions were precisely 
phrased in order to make the outcome as verifiable as possible (see Tetlock & Gardner, 2015 for 





the likelihood of Myanmar's ruling government signing a peace agreement with rebel groups?” 
“What is the likelihood of California legalizing the recreational use of marijuana?” “What is the 
likelihood of Leonardo DiCaprio winning an Oscar?” “What is the likelihood of Tesla unveiling 
the Model 3?” and “What is the likelihood of the value of Logitech stock dipping below $12 
USD?” 
Participants answered demographic questions first and then completed the prediction task 
by typing in their estimates into an open-ended text box. They also indicated how often they read 
the news. Finally, they indicated how often they used each of several strategies on a 5-point scale 
(1 = Never, 5 = Always): Random guessing, web searches, asking another person, reasoning 
about the question, and going with their gut. Participants also reported how hard they tried 
during the task on a 4-point scale (1 = Didn’t try at all, 4 = Tried very hard). They were asked to 
be honest because their answer would not affect compensation. 
Most subjects reported trying fairly hard (45%) or very hard (35%) to answer the 
questions. The most-favored strategies on a scale of 1 to 5 were reasoning about the question (M 
= 3.66, S.D. = 1.06) and going with their “gut instinct” (M = 3.52, S.D. = 1.05). The next most-
favored strategy was random guessing (M = 2.33, S.D. = .99), followed by using information 
from web-searches (M = 1.36, S.D. = .82) and asking someone (M = 1.19, S.D. = .60).  
The events were perceived to have varying likelihoods. The event perceived as most 
likely was the probability of a mass shooting in the U.S. (M = 70.05, S.D. = 30.48) and the least 
likely event was Portland, Oregon, being completely submerged in water after an offshore 
earthquake (M = 11.79, S.D. = 20.66).  





Participants of diverse national backgrounds completed three judgment tasks: predicting 
stock prices, predicting Olympic performance, and predicting news events outcomes. Unlike the 
other studies which were performed on MTurk, for this study students, faculty, and staff were 
recruited via targeted e-mails from the registrar’s office at a large Midwestern university. 
Populations of Caucasian Americans, Latin Americans, and East Asians were targeted. 
Participants who took the study were encouraged to share the study link with their friends, and 
the study was incentivized with a random prize raffle ($50 Amazon gift card) and an accuracy 
prize ($100 Amazon gift card). The target N was 200 people; 202 people completed the survey 
(222 including partially completed surveys). 
One task involved predicting future stock prices because previous work has found 
cultural differences in how people predict future trends; Chinese people tend to expect more 
future change than North Americans and they make different decisions about buying and selling 
stocks based on those judgments (14). Fifteen line graphs showing stock price trends were 
presented in random order. Each graph plotted prices for November, January, and February. The 
rest of the months were blank until June. Participants clicked on each image to indicate where 
they thought the value would be on June 19, 2016. 
In the second task, participants then predicted how many medals different countries 
would win in 9 different Olympic events – for example, “In the 2016 Olympics, how many 
medals will Brazil win in Judo?” I also asked them how people from that particular country 
would respond (“What do you think will be the average guess of Brazilian respondents?”). Three 
questions were about Latin American countries, three were about East Asian countries, and three 
were about the U.S. teams. All questions paired countries with events for which they had won at 





 Finally, participants gave likelihood estimates for 24 events similar to those in Study 6. 
The events varied in topic and were inspired by news from Latin America, North America, and 
East Asia. Afterwards, respondents reported their effort (M = 2.53, S.D. = .61, 1 = Didn’t try at 
all, 4 = Tried very hard). They also reported how often they used each of several judgment 
strategies as in Study 6: The most popular strategies, in decreasing order, were reasoning about 
the question (M = 3.43, S.D. = 1.08), “going with your gut” (M = 3.3, S.D. = 1), random guessing 
(M = 2.56, S.D. = .96), searching the web for information (M = 1.45, S.D. = .74), and asking 








Chapter III Significant Correlations 
In the table below, codes for demographic variables are described in the “demographic 
variable” column. In Study 7, the “Culture” correlations include U.S.-born Americans and 





Table B.1. Correlations Between Social Identity and Judgment, p < .01.  
Study  Demographic variable Question summary r 
1 Team 
OSU fan = 1, UM fan = 0 
How many points OSU will score .379 
2 Sex, Male = 0, Female = 1 % of votes Ted Cruz will win in NH primary .188 
2 Education, 
1 = Some HS, 6 = Post Graduate 
% of votes Bernie Sanders will win in NH primary .202 
2 Polit. Party,  
1 = R/ Lib, 2 = Dem 
% of votes Donald Trump will win in NH primary -.205 
2 Religious, 0 = non, 1 = religious % of votes Hillary Clinton will win in NH primary .198 
2 Religious % of votes Bernie Sanders will win in NH primary -.215 
2 Polit. Party % of votes Donald Trump will win in OH primary -.199 
3 Political orientation,  
1 = Very Lib, 7 = Very Cons 
% of Americans favor building a fence along the 
entire Mexican border 
.238 
3 Education % of Americans favor building a fence along the 
entire Mexican border 
-.132 
3 Religious % of Americans favor building a fence along the 
entire Mexican border 
.152 
3 Religious % of Americans favor forming a federal database to 
track gun sales 
.121 
3 Age % of Americans against the sale of assault-style 
weapons to the public 
.143 
3 Age % of Americans favor more offshore oil and gas 
drilling in the U.S. 
.172 
3 Political orientation Likelihood of Trump winning Iowa caucus .127 
3 Political orientation Likelihood of Carson winning Iowa caucus .175 
3 Education Likelihood of Clinton winning Iowa caucus .159 
3 Education Likelihood of O’Malley winning Iowa caucus -.124 
3 Age Likelihood of Clinton winning Iowa caucus .188 
3 Age Likelihood of O’Malley winning Iowa caucus -.187 
4 Political orientation % of votes Clinton will win in Idaho -.187 
4 Political orientation % of votes Clinton will win in Wyoming -.180 
4 Political orientation % of votes Clinton will win in Maryland -.294 
4 Political orientation % of votes Clinton will win in New York  -.383 
4 Political orientation % of votes Clinton will win in Vermont -.290 
4 Political orientation % of votes Clinton will win in New Jersey  -.294 
4 Political orientation % of votes Clinton will win in Ohio -.223 
4 Political orientation % of votes Clinton will win in Florida -.200 
4 Religious % of votes Clinton will win in New Jersey  -.223 
4 Political orientation % of votes Trump will win in Maryland .251 
4 Political orientation % of votes Trump will win in New York .401 
4 Political orientation % of votes Trump will win in Vermont .309 
4 Political orientation % of votes Trump will win in New Jersey  .280 
4 Political orientation % of votes Trump will win in Ohio .301 
4 Political orientation % of votes Trump will win in Florida .185 





4 Religious % of votes Trump will win in New York .200 
4 Religious % of votes Trump will win in New Jersey  .195 
5 Sex Guessed interest rating for book: All Quiet on the 
Western Front 
-.204 
5 Sex Guessed interest rating for book: Master and 
Commander 
-.252 
5 Sex Guessed interest rating for book: My Sister's Keeper .228 
5 Sex Guessed interest rating for book: The Notebook .227 
5 Age Guessed interest rating for book: Legends of the Fall .190 
5 Age Guessed interest rating for book: Master and 
Commander  
.266 
5 Ethnicity,  
White = 0, non-White = 1 
Guessed interest rating for book: Arthas .231 
5 Ethnicity Guessed interest rating for book: Pride and Prejudice .183 
6 Age Likelihood estimates for Germany's parliament 
restricting migrant privileges  
.228 
6 Education Likelihood Raul Castro vacate office -.272 
6 Education Likelihood Kanye West/Kim Kardashian publicly 
announce separation/divorce 
-.289 
6 Education Likelihood commercial civilian aircraft shot down 
during armed conflict  
-.223 
6 Political orientation Likelihood North Korea has a plutonium bomb  .183 
6 Political orientation Likelihood congress pass stricter gun control laws  .195 
6 Political orientation Likelihood Malawi pass more permissive abortion 
legislation 
.201 
6 Religious  Likelihood congress pass stricter gun laws  .183 
6 Age Likelihood Leonardo DiCaprio wins Oscar .183 
6 Sex Likelihood value of Canadian dollar rise  .186 
6 Ethnicity  Likelihood Portland submerged after earthquake .213 
6 Education Likelihood of more Ebola cases in U.S. -.192 
6 Education Likelihood lethal confrontation in East China Sea -.217 
6 Education Likelihood BP stock passing $34 per share -.184 
7 Culture,  
East Asian = 1, American = 0 
Stock value predictions for Office Depot -.216 
7 Religious Stock predictions for Facebook .177 
7 Culture Likelihood another Ebola case being reported in US .296 
7 Age Likelihood another Zika case in South Korea .217 
7 Culture Likelihood another Zika case in South Korea -.246 
7 Nationality, American = 0, non-
American = 1 
Likelihood another Zika case in South Korea -.210 
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